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ABSTRACT: 
 
Frontier friction has been a recurring phenomenon in much of the world, 
including in South and Southeast Asia. Yet the social construction of antagonistic 
border perceptions offers lessons about how not to frame a country’s views of its 
neighbors.  Though boundary disputes in South Asia are currently much more 
muted than in the past, this investigation provides a message for South Asia that 
ultra-patriotism over borders continues to endanger inter-state relations in other 
parts of Asia and can always rear its head again in South Asia.  It is thus essential 
to examine the case of Thai perceptions towards its border with Cambodia to 
understand the clash between nationalist and moderate societal groups.  The 
objective is to learn from this case that excessive border patriotism is ultimately 
harmful to national interests. This study focuses specifically on Thai perceptions 
toward the Thai-Cambodian border disputes with three questions in mind.  First, 
how have Thai elite actor perceptions evolved toward their present state?  
Second, what appears to be hindering a more moderate Thai stance with regard 
to parts of its border conflict with Cambodia?  Third, what implications are there 
from Thai-Cambodian border conflicts, if any, and what patterns can we 
generalize out of Thai border perceptions which might have implications for 
South and Southeast Asia?  This study, focusing on image formation of 
boundaries, seeks to answer these questions. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Boundary disputes generally derive from socially constructed images of ―nations‖ 
which, at the periphery, sometimes overlap each other, especially where frontier 
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demarcation remains incomplete.  In this context, the behavior of the countries‘ 
ruling elites, their foreign policy priorities and their approaches to threat 
recognition are shaped by perceptions inspired by national identity and ideologies 
embedded in cultural-religious frameworks.  Indeed, as Sezer (1992: 228) has 
stated, ―threat perception is a state of mind defined by fear of other or others who 
are believed to be, at the minimum, predisposed to undermining one‘s core values 
such as physical survival and quality of life.‖4 
This has been seen time and time again in South Asia, on bilateral and 
trilateral levels, in which colonial boundary legacies have, in newly independent 
states, given rise to frontier tensions.  For example, the border disputes (including 
also maritime boundaries) between India and Pakistan over Rann of Kutch and Sir 
Creek as well as in Kashmir (Siachen Glacier, Line of Control/LOC)
5
 have been 
framed by the complex triangular relationship with China adding struggles over 
territorial claims in Aksai Chin, Shaksgam Valley and Arunachal Pradesh along the 
McMahon line.
6
  Furthermore, India has minor disputes with Nepal, Sri Lanka, and 
Bangladesh over their boundaries.
7
 Afghanistan‘s contestation of the the so-called 
Durand line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is perceived by 
Pakistan as a serious threat towards their national unity and integrity.
8
  There are 
                                                 
4
 Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu. 1992. ‗Threat Perception in Southern Europe: The Case of 
Turkey‘, in Laszlo Valki (ed.), Changing Threat Perceptions and Military Doctrines. 
London: Macmillan, p. 228. 
5
 For the conflict between Pakistan and India over territories, see among others: Bose, 
Sumantra R. 2003. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. New Delhi: Vistaar 
Publications; Ganguly, Sumit 2002. Conflict Unending. India-Pakistan Tensions Since 
1947. New Delhi: Oxford University Press; Mitra, Subrata K. 2001. ―War and Peace in 
South Asia: A Revisionist View of India–Pakistan Relations‖, Contemporary South Asia 
(2001), 10(3), pp. 361–379; Varshney, Ashutosh. 1991. ―India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: 
Antinomies of Nationalism‖, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 11 (Nov. 1991), pp. 997-1019; 
Wirsing, Robert G. 2003. Kashmir in the Shadow of the War. Regional Rivalries in a 
Nuclear Age. Armonk: Sharpe; Schofield, Victoria. 2003. Kashmir in Conflict. India, 
Pakistan and the Unending War. London: I. B. Tauris; Ghosh, Partha S. 2002. ―From 
legalism to realism in Kashmir. Internationalising the line of control‖, in Heidelberg 
Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, No. 7, http://hpsacp.uni-hd.de/.  
6
 For further details on the India-China dimension of these boundary disputes, see among 
others: Guruswamy, Mohan and Zorawar Daulet Singh. 2009. India China Relations, the 
Border Issue and Beyond. New Delhi: Viva Books; Mehra, Parshotam. 2007. Essays in 
frontier history: India, China, and the disputed border. New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press; 
Singh, Swaran. 2003. China- South Asia: issues, equations, policies. New Delhi: Lancer's 
Books; Garver, John W. 2002. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth 
Century. Washington: University of Washington Press; Maxwell, Neville. 1999. ―Sino-
Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered‖, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 15 
(Apr. 10-16, 1999), pp. 905-918; Vohra, Sahdev 1993. The Northern Frontier of India - the 
border dispute with China. New Delhi: Intellectual Publ. House; Hoffmann, Steven A. 
1990. India and the China crisis. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; Maxwell, Neville. 
1971. India's China war. London: Cape; Department of State (USA). 1968. International 
Boundary Study, No. 85 – November 15, 1968, China – Pakistan Boundary; Rowland, 
John. 1967. A History of Sino-Indian Relations. Hostile Co-Existence. Princeton, N.J.: D. 
Van Nostrand, Princeton; Lamb, Alastair. 1964. The China-India border. The Origins of the 
Disputed Boundaries. London: Oxford Univ. Press; Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, 
Robert A. Huttenback. 1963. Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh. Pall 
Mall Press, London 1963.  
7
 Mitra, Subrata K./Wolf, Siegfried O. and Jivanta Schöttli. 2006. A Political and Economic 
Dictionary of South Asia. London: Routledge; Kabir, Ekram. 2005. Border fencing - a 
major irritant in Indo-Bangla relations. Dhaka: News Network. 
8
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also conflicts between Bangladesh and Myanmar, Bhutan and China. (See 
Appendix 1 for a detailed list of the boundary disputes in South Asia).  
Despite the quantity and the high intensity of some frontier conflagrations, 
there seems to be a gradual change in the perception of boundary conflicts among 
the elites of the involved states in South Asia and the extended region, especially 
China.  Being one of the major causal factors for the extraordinarily hostile 
relationship between India and Pakistan, border disputes in South Asia have 
hampered not only development but also have impeded integration and cooperation 
in the whole region.  Due to an increasing awareness of the socio-economic 
backslashes implicated by these obstacles, it appears that various sections of the 
political elites among the disputants have evolved an economically driven 
perception and interpretation of the unsolved boundary issues.  This finds its most 
significant expression in India-Pakistan relations in terms of the so-called 
composite dialogue
9
 (begun in 2004) and the recent India-Pakistan Joint Statement 
from Sharm-El-Sheikh on 16 July 2009.
10
  Both processes can be seen as a 
manifestation of the political will to track their international relations not from the 
perspective of national identity shaped by traditional acrimony and threat 
perceptions but by a belief in the advantages of economic and social intercourse.  
This is a phenomenon which we find in India-China relations as well.  Frontier 
ambiguity led to the 1962 border war between both countries, which soured the 
emerging friendship and economic exchanges on a larger scale.  However, bilateral 
negotiations towards settlement of the border conflicts continued, which derived 
from shared aspirations of potential economic prosperity.  This led again to a 
rapprochement in India-China relations, best expressed in the proverb Hindi Chini 
bhai bhai, Hindi Chini bye bye, Hindi-Chini buy buy.
11
  
                                                                                                                            
Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press; Omrani, Bijan. 2009. ―The Durand Line: History and 
Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border‖, Asian Affairs; July 2009, Vol. 40 Issue 2, p. 
177-195, p. 19. 
9
 The composite dialogue, started by then-Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf 
and then-Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in 2004, is the most significant step 
towards peace between India and Pakistan.  It aimed for the normalization of relations, 
encompassing a range of peace and security concerns, including Confidence-Building 
Measures (CBMs), Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek, Tulbul Navigation 
Project/Wullar Barrage, terrorism and drug trafficking, the promotion of friendly exchanges 
and greater emphasis on economic and commercial cooperation. This dialogue brought the 
Pakistani approach (which stated that first the Kashmir conflict must be resolved before 
discussing other bilateral issues) finally to an end.  For further details, see Patil, Sameer 
Suryakant. 2008. Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue, IPCS Special Report No 53, June 2008; 
Huntington, William. (2006): ―Indo-Pakistani Talks Advance‖, Arms Control Today, 36 
(2006) 5; Manjuath, K.S./Sridhar, Seema and Beryl Anand (2006): Indo-Pak Composite 
Dialogue 2004-05. A Profile. IPCS Special Report 12, February 2006. 
10
 This statement from Sharm-El-Sheikh is remarkable in that it emphasizes the need for 
promotion of regional integration. It seems that both states consider today that the 
development and elimination of poverty is one of the major contemporary challenges 
(besides the two most apparent and discussed points, 1) the delinking of action by Pakistan 
against terrorists [especially the perpetrators of the Mumbai terrorist attacks] from the 
composite dialogue between both countries; and 2) the inclusion of the Pakistan province of 
Balochistan in bilateral discussion). 
11
 In the first years after independence, India‘s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
promoted the idea of an ―Asian brotherhood‖, leading to five principles of peaceful 
coexistence (Panchasheela/Panch Shila).  In its relationship with China, this finds 
expression in the term Hindi Chini bhai bhai (―Indians and Chinese are brothers‖), coined 
by the Nehru administration.  However, among other incidents (e.g. China‘s 1950 invasion 
of Tibet, and its 1959 suppression of the opposition movements, its support for the militant-
Maoist [Naxalites] movement in India, and its occupation of territories contested by both 
countries in Aksai Chin, etc.), this border war of 1962 led to a dramatic deterioration of 
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In summary, it seems that in most South Asian states, contemporary economic 
elites have generally succeeded in moderating tense boundary policies.  As such, 
states have shifted away from traditional, reactionary border policy priorities, 
deriving from dialectically opposed state philosophies like the Two-Nation-
Theory
12
 in the case of India and Pakistan (including Bangladesh/formerly East-
Pakistan), which has been followed by old, established pressure groups such as 
religious fundamentalists, militants/extremists, terrorists as well as conservative 
circles among the military and civilian spheres. Nevertheless, these veto-players 
still try to exercise influence to maintain traditional interpretations for solutions to 
border conflicts.  
Aside from South Asia, frontier disagreements as well as disputes among 
intra-state elite actors regarding border policy have also been frequent in other 
parts of Asia.  Indeed, countries from East Timor to Japan have experienced 
boundary conflicts with neighbors, demonstrating the continuing complexity of 
blurred borders in a geographical expanse constituting 60 percent of the global 
population and 30 percent of the world‘s land area.13  
In Southeast Asia, boundary tensions were common among most countries 
until the end of the Cold War in 1991, when agreements to demarcate borders 
paved the way for greater harmony and increased trade.  Contemporary Southeast 
Asia contains but one continuing unconcealed imbroglio—festering frontier 
frictions between Thailand and Cambodia.  These tensions derive from perceptions 
by groups of elite actors in each country.  To better understand the frictions and 
disputes of elites in one of these countries (Thailand), it is thus necessary to 
examine the image-formation which has influenced Thai border perceptions with 
Cambodia.  Of course not all Thai elites oppose resolving Thai-Cambodian border 
disputes.  In fact, there are a growing number of prominent Thais who seek 
cooperation.  Thus, there has occurred, among Thai actors, a growing confrontation 
between a moderate and confrontational perception. 
This study focuses specifically on Thai perceptions towards the Thai-
Cambodian border disputes with three questions in mind.  First, how have Thai 
elite actor perceptions evolved toward their present state?  Second, what appears to 
be hindering a more moderate Thai stance with regard to parts of its border conflict 
with Cambodia?  Third, what implications are there from Thai-Cambodian border 
conflicts, if any, and what patterns can we generalize out of Thai border 
perceptions which might have implications for South and Southeast Asia?  This 
study, focusing on image formation of boundaries, seeks to answer these questions. 
The social construction of antagonistic border perceptions offers lessons about 
how not to frame a country‘s views of its neighbors.  Though boundary friction in 
South Asia is currently much more muted than in the past, this investigation 
provides a message for South Asia that ultra-patriotism over borders continues to 
                                                                                                                            
bilateral relations – ―Hindi Chini bye bye.‖  Finally, given the resurrection of trade today 
between the two countries, contemporary relations can be described as Hindi Chini buy 
buy. 
12
 The Two-Nation-Theory was introduced in 1930 by the poet, Muhammad Iqbal.  Later, 
the idea was given political form when the Muslim League in British India, led by 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, demanded the establishment of a ―Homeland‖ for Muslims in 
South Asia in areas where they were a majority.  Based on the notion that Muslims and 
Hindus are ethnically and cultural-religiously distinct, some claimed that both communities 
constituted separate ―nations‖.  Politically it was argued, that Muslims and Hindus cannot 
live together in a common state under democratic governance set up by majority rule, 
because since Hindus have the absolute majority they would dominate the Muslims and 
perhaps retaliate for perceived wrongs of the past. 
13
 United Nations. 2008. State of World Population Report.  
http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2008/presskit/docs/en-swop08-report.pdf. 
Paul W. Chambers and Siegfried O. Wolf 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  5 2 ,  F e b r u a r y  2 0 1 0                                                 5 
endanger inter-state relations in other parts of Asia and can always rear its head 
again in South Asia.  It is thus essential to examine the case of Thai perceptions 
toward its border with Cambodia to understand the clash between nationalist and 
moderate societal groups.  The objective is to learn from this case that excessive 
border patriotism is ultimately harmful to national interests. 
 
 
I. The Case of Thai Perceptions across the Thai-Cambodian Perimeter 
 
The border separating Cambodia from Thailand extends roughly 499 miles (803 
kms) from the Gulf of Siam (Gulf of Thailand) northward and then eastward to the 
Emerald Triangle at the Col (pass) de Preah Chambot.
14 
 With their long 
contiguous boundary, Thailand and Cambodia have sometimes experienced 
territorial disputes owing from an incomplete frontier demarcation.  The unclear 
boundary line has mostly resulted from the porous quality of the border, ambiguous 
mapping, years of conflict in Cambodia, and numerous land-mines along the 
frontier.  Furthermore, cross-border incidents have continued, including smuggling, 
banditry, and occasional military skirmishes. 
Since the mid-1990s, there have been approximately four areas where 
territorial disputes have encumbered amicable relations between Thailand and 
Cambodia.  In ascending order of sensitivity, these have been as follows (See 
Appendix 2): 
 
1. Minimal tensions at the border separating the Thai border district of 
Aranyapratet from the Cambodian border town of Poipet since the closure 
of refugee camps in Aranyapratet in 1999. 
2. Slight strife at the point of the Emerald Triangle, which separates Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Lao PDR.  
3. A generally equal amount of friction and concord along the maritime 
border separating Koh Kud from Koh Kong 
4. Soaring hostility at Khao Phra Viharn (Preah Vihear Temple).15 
 
This study of Thai-Cambodia border issues examines each of these issue-
areas.  It argues that history is witnessing the evolution of Thai perspectives 
regarding Thai-Cambodian border problems.  Moreover, this evolution has been 
both numerical and substantive: from one view accentuating state-centric 
patriotism to a plethora of differing standpoints.  The study concludes that although 
today one finds a myriad of Thai stances on Thai-Cambodian boundary issues, it is 
the changing relevance of different actors in Thai society and hence the shifting 
relevancies of these actors‘ viewpoints which matters most in determining the 
dominant Thai perspective today.  As such, given the growing relevance of 
business associations in Thai politics, one sees in Thailand greater attention to 
―free‖ (though not necessarily ―fair‖) trade and economic cooperation with 
Cambodia which has begun to counterbalance questions of sovereign domain (over 
rather trifling areas of land) at the border.  At the same time, the continuing 
importance of Thailand‘s military as a political actor means that boundary-related 
issues of national security continue to have some priority. In the long run, however, 
                                                 
14
 Cambodia‘s boundary lengths: Laos, 541 kilometers (336 miles); Vietnam, 1,228 
kilometers (763 miles); Gulf of Thailand coastline, 443 kilometers (275 miles); Thailand, 
803 kilometers (499 miles); territorial sea limit, 12 miles. 
15
 To avoid confusion, this study uses the Cambodian ―Preah Vihear‖ but notes the Thai 
usage of Khao Phra Viharn. Neither usage is meant to convey bias on the author‘s part.  
Please see footnote 46 for further elaboration on the usages of these terms by Cambodians 
and Thais. 
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Thai perspectives, guided increasingly by successful collaboration in integrative 
issue areas, including the exigencies of commerce, may contribute to an 
amelioration of Thai-Cambodian border tensions.  Ultimately, collective 
nationalistic identities which aspire to coercion can be cognitively reshaped to 
produce convivial cooperation. 
In terms of structure, this study analyzes the current Thai-Cambodian 
boundary situation as well as the perceptions of relevant Thai actors towards it.  
Firstly, it examines the history of Thai perspectives through a review of literature, 
noting the actors, their perceptions and the explanation for these perceptions.  Four 
perspectives in the literature are presented in historical order, evolving from 
confrontation to economic collaboration as well as a view of ―territoriality‖ in 
terms of lifeless modernism.  Secondly, the study examines border problems in 
historical detail.  Though the frontier is not fully demarcated, the four principal 
flashpoints have been Aranyaprathet-Poipet, the Emerald Triangle, the sea border, 
and certain frontier temples (e.g. Preah Vihear sanctuary).  Thirdly, the study 
presents the results of extended interviews with respondents from four different 
groups of actors representing alternate viewpoints.  These include Traditional 
Powers (Privy Council and military); Pro-Thaksin Shinawatra political parties 
(mostly Palang Prachachon [People‘s Power Party]/Puea Thai[For Thais])16; the 
anti-Thaksin political parties (Prachatipat or the Democrat Party); and Extra-
Parliamentary Forces (demonstrators, academics, and journalists).  Each was 
queried over their perceptions regarding the suitable Thai position towards each of 
the aforementioned cases and plausible arguments for the different stances were 
offered.  Finally, using a social constructivist approach, the study submits policy 
recommendations at the state, societal, and international levels.  
 
 
II. A Review of Thai Perceptions in Literature toward its Boundary with 
Cambodia  
 
Thai perceptions of Cambodian claims to territorial integrity have traditionally 
been fraught with a combination of mistrust, condescension, and abhorrence.  Still, 
some recent Thai viewpoints reflect a potential transformation in Bangkok‘s 
traditional attitudes (e.g. Thongchai 1994).   
To begin the review, it is necessary to start with some history.  The relations 
among Southeast Asian kingdoms were traditionally tribute-based and suzerain in 
nature.  Exact borderlines and boundary perspectives were ambiguous.  Until 
perhaps 1238, the majority of the kingdoms of what became Siam were vassals of 
the Khmer Empire.  But as the Khmers declined in political prowess, the Siamese 
arose and gained a preponderance of power over the Khmer—which eventually 
became a tribute kingdom of Siam.  When French and British colonialists arrived 
in Southeast Asia, they applied exact border demarcation.  This concept, new to 
Siam, led to a re-alignment of its borders.  In 1863, Khmer or Cambodia became a 
French Protectorate.  Following a Siamese-Franco military crisis in 1893, Siam 
agreed to cede territory north of the Mekong River to France.  Siam‘s northeast 
was faraway from Bangkok and became vulnerable to French advances.  As such, 
in 1904 Siam ceded the northwestern area of present-day Cambodia which the map 
below labels (A), and later that year handed over the coastal areas of (C) and (D).  
A 1907 Franco-Siamese border agreement, a reworking of the 1904 treaty, further 
ceded Siem Reap, Battambang, and Sisosphon (B).  The irredentist Indochina War 
                                                 
16
 Palang Prachachon (PPP), the party of ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was 
dissolved in December 2008. Subsequently most of the members of PPP shifted to the new 
pro-Thaksin party Puea Thai. 
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of 1940-41, which, through Imperial Japan‘s assistance, ended in Thai gains over 
French Indochina, was, in the Thai view at the time, merely an equitable correction 
in terms of Thailand‘s boundaries with French colonialists (IBS 1966).  
Cambodians, however, viewed Thailand‘s 1941 moves as merely taking advantage 
of wartime conditions to invade Cambodia and make a deal with the French when 
the latter were weak.  Only with the 1946 Treaty of Washington was Siam forced 
to return this territory to France—an outcome which Thais might chafe over but 
which Cambodians might see as simple justice. (St. John 1994: 1).  Figure 1 below 
offers a chronology of the areas Thailand ceded to Paris to form the current Thai-
Cambodian boundary—an outcome which Cambodians generally applaud but 
which the traditional Thai viewpoint says occurred ―under duress‖ (IBS 1966: 5). 
 
 
Figure 1: Map illustrating Siam’s chronological ceding of territories to France  
 
 
 
Source: St. John 1994: 65 
 
Chronologically, four perspectives tend to dominate the literature of Thai 
perceptions toward Thai-Cambodian border relations.
17
  The first and earliest Thai 
perspective, founded upon notions of state-centrism and sovereign survival, was as 
such both nationalist and irredentist.  This perception, emanating from the 
worldview of the Thai monarchy and its attendant military, tended to place 
Cambodia in a negative light and it has often pervaded Bangkok‘s policy toward 
Phnom Penh, contributing to a latently sour relationship.  It formed the Thai meta-
historical discourse regarding the Thai-Cambodian border. Writings such as M. 
Sivaram‘s Mekong Clash and Far East Crisis (1941) and, more recently, Manich 
Jumsai‘s History of Thailand and Cambodia (1988, 2001) manifests a Thai 
                                                 
17
 The criteria for selecting this literature are threefold.  First, the writer must either be Thai 
or write from the perception of Thailand. Second, the work must intentionally address Thai 
perceptions on some aspect of the Thai-Cambodian border.  Third, all such literature which 
is available must be utilized.  In general, the quantity of literature available on Thai 
perceptions toward the Thai-Cambodian frontier is low.  As for quality, most is quite dated.  
Very little of the literature is academic, the far majority being polemical, popular reading. 
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perception emphasizing the survival and preservation of Thailand, in terms of 
territory, monarchy, and nation.  During this mostly pre-Cold War period, the 
Kingdom of Thailand was threatened with incursions from French colonial 
Cambodge (within Indochine) as well as from Cambodia itself (shortly after its 
independence). 
A second perspective on the Thai-Cambodian frontier paralleled the growing 
Cold War of the 1950 and ‗60s. The actors at this time were Thailand‘s military 
and monarchy, who were concerned with maintaining Thailand‘s territorial 
integrity with Cambodia but also winning a Communist insurgency. Furthermore, 
during this period, a number of Western studies appeared (IBS 1966; Gordon 1966; 
Liefer 1967). For the Thai side (cf. Khien 1983), Perspective II emphasizes Thai 
national security concerns along the Thai-Cambodian border in the face of foreign-
inspired Communist dangers.  During this time, such fears guaranteed the primacy 
of the military and monarchy, the principal pillars of the country‘s national 
security.   
During the 1990s, a third perspective appeared on Thai-Cambodian boundary 
relations as Cambodia arose out of its civil war and Thailand‘s role in the Mekong 
basin began to grow.  This perspective mirrored the growing number of actors with 
relevant perceptions: the military, the monarchy, as well as civilian governments 
dominated by Thai businesspeople.  This latter group was more accommodating 
with Cambodia regarding these issues due to their desire to promote trade.  This 
perception was reflected in new studies such as Suchita Ghosh‘s Thailand: Tryst 
with Modernity (1997). Furthermore, in 2008, a flurry of books in Thai appeared, 
published simultaneous to the 2008 crisis over the sanctuary. Some of these 
emphasized the need for closer cooperation on border issues.  At the same time, 
most stressed Bangkok‘s desire to stand firm against losing any territory to Phnom 
Penh.  All in all, it seems that in the post-Cold War period of the 1990s and 2000s, 
there were growing Thai aspirations for greater cooperation with Cambodia.  Yet in 
2008, amidst the crisis which occurred at Preah Vihear, there was more variety in 
the literature: some promoting a soft approach and others taking a hard-line toward 
the Cambodian government‘s border policy. 
Beyond these three perspectives, there is yet a fourth lens through which one 
can approach Thai perspectives toward Thai-Cambodian territorial disputes. This is 
the viewpoint offered by Thongchai Winichakul in Siam Mapped: a History of the 
Geo-Body of a Nation (1994).  It presents a generally unbiased Thai standpoint 
which sees problems of Thai perceptions towards the frontier as embedded within 
lifeless (and modernist) notions of territoriality for which people are willing to die.  
For Thongchai, ―the geo-body of a nation is a ―man-made territorial definition 
which creates effects—by classifying, communicating, and enforcement—on 
people, things, and relationships.‖  Derived from socially-constructed spatial 
knowledge, it is an effect of modern geographical discourse and is crucial to a 
nation‘s identity (Thongchai 1994: 17).  An example of such ―mapping‖ can be 
seen in Appendix 3. Thongchai argues that Siam lost her control over Cambodia to 
France because a pre-modern conception of polity lost out to Western modernity in 
mapping.  The pre-modern mandala system, practiced by Siam and its neighbors, 
presented a kingdom within a vaguely definable area without any fixed boundaries.  
The 1863 Franco-Cambodian agreement made Cambodia a protectorate of France 
but Siam may have seen this protectorate as a tributary in the eastern sense: a 
―pratetsarat‖ which allowed for multiple sovereignty.‖  Then France, followed by 
Siam, appealed their claims of sovereignty over Cambodia to the western-
dominated international community based upon ―international law.‖  Not 
surprisingly, France won the case (Thongchai 1994: 82-94). 
Thongchai emphasizes that Thai perspectives toward territorial disputes 
correspond to the Thai geo-body‘s need to differentiate ―we-ness‖ from 
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―otherness.‖ The Khmer are of course the foreigner—the ―other,‖ and are seen by 
most Thais as deserving of the highest suspicion. As such, many Thais have 
perceived the ―Khmer‖ as ―cowardly,‖ ―opportunistic,‖ and intent on attacking 
Thailand when she is most vulnerable.  Ultimately, Thongchai offers a refreshingly 
post-modernist historical approach in explaining how Thai perspectives toward 
―territoriality‖ and ―nation‖ have probably contributed to continuing border 
disputes with Cambodia today.  Among certain Thai academics, Thongchai‘s 
perception is popular.  But the far majority of Thais still view Thai-Cambodian 
border relations through either a national security or free trade lens.  
Ultimately, the aforementioned literature grouped into the perspectives one to 
three reflect the tenor of the times in which they were written.  The first and second 
views embrace a viewpoint in which the state seemed on the brink of destruction.  
As such, regarding Thai perceptions toward the frontier emphasized suspicion, 
fear, and national survival concerns.  The third perspective represents a possible 
move toward seeking accommodation with the Cambodian government on 
lingering border issues (though in 2008 there was a smattering of anti-Cambodian 
Thai literature).  The fourth and last view provides a less nationalistic and more 
balanced understanding of how the Thai-Cambodian boundary historically evolved.  
This view forces people to question not each other, but rather to scrutinize concepts 
such as ―border‖ or ―territoriality‖ to begin to understand how identities become 
socially constructed.   
 
 
III.Territorial Problems Today: Four Cases 
 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, Thai-Cambodian border tensions have 
diminished considerably—though in 2008 frictions again festered.  In the mid-
1990s, the countries‘ two militaries launched a General Border Committee (GBC) 
to resolve frontier problems.  In 2000, the two countries established a joint 
boundary commission (JBC) to survey and demarcate the frontier.  But the 
continuing lack of clear demarcation provided fodder for occasional cross-border 
tensions.  At least 15 border areas remained in dispute. 
By 2001, Thai foreign policy seemed to encourage trade cooperation over 
historical animosity.  This was explicitly reflected in in-coming Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra‘s ―forward engagement‖ policy, which prioritized Thai 
business interests in external relations.  ―Forward engagement‖ has also shaped 
Thai governmental perspectives toward Thai-Cambodian border relations, with 
greater concern for private sector accommodation than territorial confrontation.  
This policy has continued under the Surayud and Samak administrations.  Still, 
there have been four specific geographical sites—Aranyaprathet-Poipet, the 
Emerald Triangle, the sea border, and frontier temples—where boundary problems 
have been especially prevalent.  These cases are significant because they have, 
more than any other Thai-Cambodian border area case, led to a heightening of 
tensions between the governments of each side.  All four cases have represented 
contested border sites along a largely unmarked frontier.  Still, only general 
boundary relations, the sea border, and Preah Vihear actually appear in the 
literature.   
The early literature (Perspectives I and II) failed to address the need for a 
clear, mutually-agreed upon delineation because they were mired in conflict—
either with colonial France or with Communist forces.  Perspective III, however, 
promotes the generation cross-border trade as a potential source of economic 
growth while Perspective IV recognizes the need for an easing of border tensions 
for purposes of peace.  However, actual negotiations were slow.  Given their 
persistence, this study thus acknowledges these four contested border sites. In the 
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pages that follow, it elaborates upon each of them in ascending order of urgency.  
Afterwards, the study interviews relevant Thai decision-makers so as to shed light 
on their perceptions of each of the flash-points. 
 
 
Case I: Aranyaprathet-Poipet
18
 
 
From the 1970s until the late 1990s, one area of Thai-Cambodian border problems 
was at Thailand‘s eastern boundary dividing Aranyaprathet, Thailand from Poipet, 
Cambodia.  The problems at this location primarily owed to two factors: 
Bangkok‘s support of the Khmer Rouge during the Vietnamese occupation of 
Cambodia, and Thailand‘s limited acceptance of Cambodian refugees into 
Aranyaprathet.  Puangthong Rungswasdisab presents a compelling of Thai foreign 
policy toward Cambodia from the 1970s to the 1990s entitled ―Thailand‘s 
Response to the Cambodian Genocide.‖  Thailand was apparently forcing some 
refugees at the border to enlist as recruits for Pol Pot while some Thai soldiers 
secretly acted as guerrilla commanders for the Khmer Rouge (Puangthong 2004: 
98).  As for Thai perspectives, she emphasizes that Thai authorities publicly saw 
the Cambodian refugees along the border as an ―economic burden‖ although 
―humanitarian principles‖ were also important.  Still, what the Thais did not say 
was that they were benefiting from the refugees in terms of a ―thriving black 
market and property boom in Aranyaprathet.  Aid workers further helped 
Aranyaprathet‘s economy to soar.  Moreover, many Thais became involved with 
these Cambodians in cross-border trading (Puangthong 2004: 99).  With the advent 
of the Chatchai Chunhavan government in 1988, Cold War perspectives were 
increasingly being replaced by trade-based realism.  By 1992, border problems had 
considerably declined simultaneous to the opening of 27 temporary border 
checkpoints and the expansion of trade between the two countries (Puangthong 
2004: 105).  Ultimately, Puangthong offers a multiplicity of perspectives toward 
Thai-Cambodian border problems by Thai officials.  Outwardly, Thailand appeared 
compassionate to the refugees while worried that they might overburden the Thai 
economy.  Internally, Thai officials utilized the refugees at the border to enhance 
their economic and political agenda in Cambodia.  Since 1992, the needs of 
business have trumped other considerations with regard to Thai perceptions of 
Cambodia.  Regarding Aranyaprathet-Poipet, ever since refugee camps closed in 
1999, border problems have been few, involving only smuggling and crime.  
In 2001, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) of the ADB (Asian 
Development Bank) began pushing for a series of transport and economic corridors 
throughout mainland Southeast Asia.  The southern corridor connects Bangkok to 
Phnom Penh.  The northern tier of this corridor transects Aranyaprathet and Poipet.  
This development is expected to bring more growth in trade and infrastructure 
between the two border towns.  Rail linkages along this route are rapidly 
expanding.  Paralleling this phenomenon has been the rise of Thai casino tourism 
in Poipet, given that casino gambling is illegal in Thailand.  Today there are 
currently eight casinos in Poipet, mostly operated by Thais.
19
  Such tourism is 
enhancing the cross-border economy though poverty remains endemic.  Finally 
there has been the construction of an export processing zone in Poipet which has 
attracted numerous Thai investors.  Though the border here was closed temporarily 
                                                 
18
 See Appendix 2. 
19
 Poipet Casinos and Poipet. 2009. Casino City, Your Guide to Gaming Excitement, 
http://www.casinocity.com/kh/poipet/casinos.html; ―Cambodia Pins Hopes on Foreign 
Investors for Growth,‖ Associated Press, 2004, 
http://www.cambodianonline.net/articles200422.htm.  
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following the 2003 destruction of the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh,
20
 frontier 
trade, tourism and industrial activities are increasingly on the rise.  Thus today, 
along the Aranyaprathet-Poipet border, there are few problems to speak of.  Any 
frictions only derive from occasional border crimes or reverberations from 
unrelated Thai-Cambodian antagonisms elsewhere.  For example, in October 2008, 
the Preah Vihear hostilities led to somewhat higher security and a slight tourist 
slump at the Aranyaprathet-Poipet border area.
21
  In 2009 tensions dissipated 
markedly following the Abhisit Vechachiwa government‘s agreement to finance 
improvements for a Cambodian highway leading to Aranyaprathet.
22
 
 
 
Case II: The Emerald Triangle
23
  
 
The ―Emerald Triangle‖ has itself offered a border debacle for Thais and 
Cambodians.  In the late 1990s, bureaucrats and businesspeople from Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Lao PDR envisioned building an Emerald Triangle Project—
including a golf course, entertainment complex, and other related projects which 
would extend across the area where the three countries‘ borders meet.  Later, in 
2003, the three countries met to kick off the Emerald Triangle Cooperation, a 
strategy to promote tourism and generate economic growth in the tri-border area. 
The only obstacles to these projects have been that they are set to commence 
at the site of former war zones where boundary demarcation had been limited and 
difficult to accomplish.  Moreover, there still needed to be mine clearance across 
this area.  But before de-mining can begin, the three countries must decide exactly 
where each of their boundaries begins and ends in this forested area.
24
  Further, 
there has been an up-roar from Thai environmentalists who have alleged that the 
watershed in Thailand‘s Ubon Ratchathani province would be damaged by the 
creation of a golf course.  By early 2008, it appeared that the Emerald Triangle and 
its various tourism projects had mostly been placed on hold.  The need for de-
mining (estimated to cost US$70 million
25
), the lack of transportation 
infrastructure, inadequate customs services, the ire of Thai environmentalists, and a 
poorly-defined border have been among the complaints raised by different sectors 
of Thai society toward the Emerald Triangle projects.
26
  However, after a 5-year 
                                                 
20
 In January 2003, a Cambodian newspaper alleged (which was later proved to be wrong) 
that Thai actress Suvanant Kongying had stated that Angkor Wat belonged to Thailand.  
When other Cambodian media picked up the story, Cambodian nationalism was stirred up 
to the point that on January 29 the Thai embassy was burned and several Thai properties in 
Cambodia were destroyed.  The incident led to a downgrading in relations between the two 
countries for at least a year.  See The New York Times, ―Cambodia Apologizes to Thailand 
over Riot,‖ January 31, 2003. 
21
 Suchat Sritama. ―Tourists Call Off Trips to Ancient Ruins,‖ The Nation, October 17, 
2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 
22
 Bangkok Post. ―Phnom Penh Eases Fears over Oil Concessions,‖ August 5, 2009, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com.  
23
 See Appendix 2. 
24 Gagliardi, Jason. ―Detour,‖ Time Magazine, May 13, 2002, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,237080,00.html?iid=chix-sphere.
 
 
25
 Yongyut Trisurat. ―Strategies for Trans-Boundary Biodiversity Conservation: ―A Case of 
Pha Taem Protected Forests Complex Between Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos,‖ 
ITTO/IUCN International Workshop on Increasing the Effectiveness of Transboundary 
Conservation Areas in Tropical Forests, 17-21 February 2003, Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand. 
26 The Nation. ―Where Frontiers Fade,‖ October 18, 2003, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com.  
The Nation. ―Emerald Triangle: Outcry Over Golf Course,‖ February 15, 2002, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
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delay, in March 2008, the Samak government announced that it intended to go 
ahead with the Emerald Triangle Cooperation agreement though studies had to first 
be carried out.  It cited frequent changes in Thai governments as a reason for a 
delay in the project.
27
  Over the summer of 2008, as Thai-Cambodian tensions 
began to rise over Preah Vihear, the friction managed to reverberate across to the 
Emerald Triangle. On October 22, 2008, Thailand‘s Foreign Ministry sent a letter 
of protest to the Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok over the Cambodian 
government‘s alleged deployment (on September 18) of seven Cambodian soldiers 
occupy the Trimuk Pavilion (Sala Trimuk), near the place where the boundaries of 
Thailand, Lao PDR, and Cambodia meet.  The memorandum continued that since 
the Emerald Triangle area had yet to be demarcated and was still subject to 
negotiation by Thailand and Lao PDR, then the Cambodian government must 
―promptly withdraw its troops.‖28  In 2009, the countries were continuing to seek 
reductions in frontier tensions under the auspices of the Thailand-Cambodia Joint 
Boundary Commission.  In January, Thailand and Cambodia jointly proposed that 
the three countries take up the subject of the Emerald Triangle at the 2009 ASEAN 
summit to promote mutual tourism earnings.
29
  However, a global economic 
slowdown, combined with continuing Thai-Cambodian tensions over Preah Vihear 
and domestic political troubles in Thailand, have decelerated progress toward a 
realization of a Thai-Lao-Cambodian Emerald Triangle project, almost braking it 
entirely.
30
  Still, talks are continuing. 
 
 
Case III: The Sea Border
31
 
 
With regard to the Thai-Cambodian maritime boundary, a 16,156 square mile area 
(26,000 sq km) in the Gulf of Thailand contains overlapping claims.  As such, 
Bangkok and Phnom Penh have disputed the extent between them of territorial 
waters (12 miles [22 km]), contiguous zones (24 miles [44 km]), and continental 
shelf or exclusive economic zone (200 miles [370 km]).   
In the 1904 Franco-Siam Treaty, Bangkok ceded Koh Kong to Paris but an 
actual sea demarcation never occurred.  The border was generalized by ―drawing a 
line through the coastal terminus of the Thai-Cambodian frontier [in Thailand‘s 
Trat Province] and the highest summit on Koh Kut Island.‖32  Much later, Thailand 
saw this treaty as having been entered into ―under duress‖, and drew its boundary 
line between Koh Kut and Koh Kong.
33
  It was not until the 1960s that Thailand 
and Cambodia began to lay claim to areas of the sea border as well as Koh Kut, 
perhaps because of the just-settled World Court decision of 1962 and continuing 
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 ASEANAffairs.com. ―Thailand/Emerald Triangle: Thai Govt to Revive Tourism 
Cooperation Drive.‖ March 30, 2008, 
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 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Press Release: Thailand Protests Cambodia, October 22, 
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E56.  
29
 Kavi Chongkittavorn. ―Thailand and Cambodia: Mending Fences and Revitalizing 
Cooperation,‖ The Nation, January 28, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.  
30
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Dream?,― The Nation, October 7, 2009.http://www.nationmultimedia.com.  
31
 See Appendix 2.  
32
 St. John, Ronald Bruce. 1998. The Land Boundaries of Indochina: Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam. Durham, England: International Boundaries Research Unit, Mountjoy Research 
Centre, University of Durham, p. 43.  
33 Piyaporn Wongruang. ―The Scrap of Land on Which Our Future Lies,‖ Bangkok Post, 
July 29, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
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nationalism in both Cambodia and Thailand.  Furthermore, in 1963, Thailand 
warned Cambodia to stay away from Koh Kut and in 1965 the two countries 
violent maritime clash a military clash over the island.  Koh Kut‘s sovereignty 
today remains disputed (though Thailand is de facto in control). 
Both countries have put more recent emphasis on settling the ocean floor 
boundary since vast oil and gas reserves are thought to exist under the ocean floor 
around the boundary area.  Beginning in 1964 international oil companies began to 
become interested in exploring for oil in the Gulf of Thailand.  In 1968, Bangkok 
issued concessions to explore for offshore oil to six foreign oil companies 
(including Chevron, Union Oil, British Gas, Idemitsu, and Mitsui Oil).  1972 saw a 
major discovery of oil by Union Oil in the Gulf.
34
 
The increasing number of concessions granted to oil companies by Bangkok 
coincided with a 1970 Thai claim of a territorial baseline around Koh Kut (see map 
in Figure 2).  In 1972, Cambodia officially announced their baseline and EEZ 
claim (which veered toward Thailand as much as possible).  Then in 1973, 
Thailand laid claim to a similarly vast EEZ, which extended as far as possible 
towards Cambodia.  Neither side based a claim on equidistance but rather sought to 
benefit as much as possible from potential oil/gas deposits in the Gulf of Thailand.  
Regarding the central perpendicular lines marking the extent of each country‘s 
EEZ, Cambodia and Thailand each used specific islands as base-points to gain a 
more favorable territorial position vis-à-vis the other.
35
   
The 1975 fall of Lon Nol in Phnom Penh and civil war in Cambodia stopped 
any potential maritime border talks in their tracks until the 1990s.  In 1995, 
Thailand and Cambodia agreed to establish a joint commission to resolve this 
dispute.  But by 1997 a commission had still not been established, a resolution had 
yet to be reached, and continuing chaos in Cambodia put negotiations on hold.  In 
1997, Phnom Penh awarded licenses to Conoco Phillips, Shell Oil, and Idemitsu 
covering the same exact areas which Thailand had claimed for oil exploration in 
1968.  By 2000, several blocks of maritime oil fields had been identified and 
different foreign companies had been granted rights to explore them—with 
Thailand and Cambodia issuing overlapping concessions in some cases.  Block 
―A‖ (5) and part of ―B‖ (6) became the ―main obstacle centres‖ of the dispute.36 
In 2000, Cambodia‘s Prime Minister Hun Sen proposed that the issue of 
sovereignty be shelved so that joint development (e.g. joint exploitation) should 
commence but Thailand rejected the proposal.  Interestingly, Cambodia had 
previously rejected a similar Thai proposal back in 1998.  Ultimately, in 2001 
Thailand and Cambodia signed an MOU to commence talks over these overlapping 
maritime claims.  The talks led to an initial agreement in principle to share profits 
from a total of eight blocks of petroleum fields in the overlapping claims area.  But 
these discussions petered out following the torching of the Thai embassy by 
Cambodian rioters in 2003: there have only been five fruitless meetings.  Since 
then, Bangkok and Phnom Penh have proposed various ideas as to sharing from the 
benefits of the overlapping maritime area and its potential oil and gas deposits.  
One company exploring for gas near the disputed zone—Chevron—reportedly 
struck oil in Block ―A‖ in 2005.  But rumors abounded that even more oil and gas 
                                                 
34 
Ratana Poonsombudlert, Chandler, Albert T., Hunt Talmage, E.T. Chandler and Thong-
ek. Thai Petroleum Concessions: Industry and Legislative History. March 2008, 
http://www.ctlo.com/tpc.htm.
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Prescott, Victor and Clive Schofield. 2001. Undelimited Maritime Boundaries of the 
Asian Rim in the Pacific Ocean. Durham, England: Imprint, Maritime Briefing, University 
of Durham, p. 12-13.
 
36 Yuthana Priwan and Nareerat Wiriyapong. ―Thai-Cambodian Oil Talks Stall: Border 
Dispute Blocks Long-Sought Deal,‖ Bangkok Post, August 29, 2008, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com.
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deposits were exactly in the disputed zone.  For Chevron and other energy 
companies, the discovery of oil added a sense of urgency to the resolution of the 
Thai-Cambodian maritime boundary dispute.
37
  The desperation further owes to the 
fact that companies holding concessions cannot gain access to the areas in question 
until the disputes are resolved. 
Negotiations continued throughout the Thaksin years (2001-6).  Indeed, 
Bangkok proposed to divide the ODA into three strips running north-south, with 
the revenue from the central area to be shared equally. The share from the outer 
areas would be weighted in favor of the country adjacent to that area.  But the area 
to the west is most (the ODA itself) was seen to more likely have oil deposits and 
that, favoring Thailand, has caused the Cambodian government to reject this.  
Meanwhile, it has sought to divide the area vertically down the middle and six 
times horizontally, creating 14 different blocks. Revenues from the blocks would 
be shared equally.  But the Thai government has rejected this.  Furthermore, 
Thailand‘s 2006 coup and 2008 land border problems with Cambodia have slowed 
down negotiation of the maritime border considerably.
38
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Symon, Andrew ―Cambodia, Thailand Struggle over Petroleum,‖ Asian Times Online, 
June 13, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IF13Ae06.html.
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Figure 2:
39
  
 
Left: Map of maritime overlapping boundary claim area (OCA) between Thailand 
and Cambodia.  Included are baseline claims and the equidistance line.   
 
Right: The OCA is alleged to be rich in oil/gas deposits.  Both Thailand and 
Cambodia have already allocated offshore blocks for energy exploration.  Block A 
was given to UNOCAL (bought by Chevron) which discovered oil at Block A in 
2005. 
 
 
 
 
In May 2008 it was announced that former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra was planning to open a casino on Koh Kong, on the Cambodian side of 
the maritime frontier and was pushing to make Koh Kong into a special economic 
zone.  This development occurred simultaneous to the establishment of Road 48 
(built with Thai Bhat 1 billion) which would link Koh Kong to the Laem Chabang 
port in Chonburi, Thailand.  Both Thaksin and the Cambodian government have 
denied any trade-offs involving the Preah Vihear dispute (see below) and the talks 
to resolve the overlapping maritime border.
40
  Ultimately, two casinos have 
recently been constructed but it appears that Thaksin‘s role in Koh Kong is less 
pronounced than was originally thought: the chief investors in Koh Kong‘s 
development are not only Thai but also Korean and Cambodian.
41
 
Today a sea marker (No.73) in the Gulf of Thailand indicates the invisible 
maritime boundary line dividing the two countries‘s sea territories, separating 
                                                 
39 
Figures derived from Prescott, Victor and Clive Schofield. 2001. Undelimited Maritime 
Boundaries of the Asian Rim in the Pacific Ocean. Durham, England: Imprint, Maritime 
Briefing, p. 12; http://www.apacnews.net/spreport/kb391.htm.
 
40 Jakkrit Waewkraihong and Thanida Tansubhapol. ―Thaksin ‗Wants to Open Koh Kong 
Casino,‘‖ The Nation, May 15, 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 
41 Nareerat Wiriyapong. ―Islanders Gamble on their Future,‖ Bangkok Post, September 14, 
2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 
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Thailand‘s Koh Kud from Cambodia‘s Koh Kong.  According to Nayan Chanda 
(2001), oil and gas reserves as well as fishing rights have been threatened by 
potentially different interpretations of the correct positioning of marker 73.
42
  
Moreover, Thai officials have suspected that Cambodians have been surreptitiously 
moving the marker to give them more territory to drill for natural resources.
43
  
More talks over the maritime boundary were planned for fall 2008 but 
Thailand‘s political turbulence placed a delay on them, especially given that three 
Thai Prime Ministers revolved through office in 2008.  Today it seems that 
resolution of the maritime boundary dispute, potentially beneficial to both Thailand 
and Cambodia, could take a long time to settle.  In 2009, rumors surfaced that 
Cambodia would award Chevron and other foreign oil companies rights to drill for 
energy in the disputed maritime area.  But in August, Cambodia assured Thailand 
that it had no plans to grant such concessions, easing Thai fears, and reducing sea 
border tensions.
44
 
 
Case IV. The Khao Phra Viharn/Preah Vihear Temple
45
  
 
Figure 3  
 
Left: cover of book entitled The International Court of Justice: Case of Prasat 
Phra Viharn (1962).  
Right: photo of Thai troops bringing down Thai flag over Preah Vihear for last 
time in 1962.  This photo was prominently displayed at PAD rallies in 2008. 
 
  
 
  Source: Manager newspaper, http://manager.co.th/ 
 
The failure of Thailand and Cambodia to thus far demarcate their land frontier has 
meant that a number of ancient Khmer sanctuaries at the borderline have suffered 
                                                 
42 Nayan Chanda. ―Cambodia and Thailand: So Much Oil, So Hard to Get,‖ Far Eastern 
Economic Review (June 21, 2001), 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN001665.pdf.
  
 
43 Nayan Chanda. ―Cambodia and Thailand: So Much Oil, So Hard to Get,‖ Far Eastern 
Economic Review (June 21, 2001), 
 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN001665.pdf.
   
44
 Bangkok Post. ―Phnom Penh Eases Feas over Oil Concessions,‖ August 5, 2009, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com.  
45
 See Appendix 2. 
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from a lack of clear legal delineation.  Since 1962, the most fought-over border 
temple and sensitive site of Thai-Cambodian border problems has centered upon 
the complex referred to by Thais as Khao Phra Viharn and by Cambodians as 
Preah Vihear.
46
  The temple was ceded by Siam to France under duress in 1904 
and 1907.  Manich (2001) states that the temple conflict with post-colonial 
Cambodia originally arose because France (the colonial master of Cambodia) had 
deviated from commonly-accepted international practices in refusing to recognize 
the watershed of the Dongrek mountains as the boundary between Thailand and 
Cambodia (Preah Vihear was on the Thai side).  As such, Paris had no right to 
claim territorial jurisdiction over Preah Vihear.
47
 
In 1962, the issue went to the World Court in The Hague, and that body‘s 
decision in favor of Cambodia on June 15, 1962 certainly upset Bangkok‘s leader 
Marshall Sarit Thanarat.  But he ―overcame his grief and complied with the 
decision (Manich, p.284).‖  Actually, contrary to what Manich writes, Sarit was 
ready to refuse the handover of the temple.  However, Thailand‘s King Bhumipol 
Adulyadej― commanded the government to obey the court‘s order.48    
During the 1990s, Preah Vihear continued to rear its head in Thai-Cambodian 
territorial relations.  As turmoil in Cambodia began to subside, the temple reopened 
(1992).  This allowed Thailand to exercise ―effective sovereignty‖ over the temple 
(the crux of Thailand‘s legal position in the 1962 case; cf. St. John 1994).  
Meanwhile, during the 1990s, both privately and publicly produced Thai maps 
continued to show Preah Vihear in Thai territory (St. John 1994).  
In 2000 Thailand and Cambodia signed an MOU creating a Joint Boundary 
Commission (JBC). Article 5 of this MOU, mandated for both sides to refrain from 
undertaking actions that might change the border‘s environment.  In June 2003, 
relations finally took off with the first-ever joint cabinet meeting between the 
governments of Cambodia‘s Hun Sen and Thailand‘s Thaksin Shinawatra.  The 
joint panel administering the sanctuary was officially established in March 2004.  
In May, the temple became a permanent border crossing point.  
In 2007 Cambodia requested that Preah Vihear be listed as a United Nations 
Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site.  
Such a classification would win Phnom Penh funding to develop the sanctuary and 
area around it in terms of preservation.  Thailand supported this listing in principle.  
However, when Bangkok refused to wholeheartedly support the classification 
without completing border demarcation around the temple and fully implementing 
the establishment of a joint management team, Unesco's World Heritage 
Committee delayed until 2008 a decision to put the shrine on its list. 
Still, in January 2008, divisions in Thai elite perspectives toward Preah 
Vihear revealed themselves.  Such disagreements perhaps reflect the September 19, 
2006 military overthrow of the PM Thaksin Shinawatra and his government.  In 
that case, one may fully understand the 2007 refusal of the Thai government to 
                                                 
46 
The dispute is thus semantic as well as legal and historical. Cambodians write and 
pronounce the term ប្រាសាទប្ររះវិហារ (Preah Vihear in English) to refer to the temple.  For Thais, 
though all pronounce the temple‘s name in Thai language as ប្រាសាទប្ររះវិហារ (Khao Phra Viharn), 
and it is always written this way in Thai language, there are divisions among Thais with 
regard to the spelling in English.  For example, the Thai state uses the following English 
temple name: Khao Phra Viharn National Park.  Yet the Thai daily newspapers Bangkok 
Post and The Nation, perhaps because they have a non-Thai readership (and the 
international term for the temple is Preah Vihear) and thus seek to be less biased, use this 
latter spelling in English when referring to the temple. 
47 
M.R. Manich Jumsai. 2001. History of Thailand and Cambodia. Bangkok: Chalermnit, 
pp. 269-81.
 
48  Time Magazine. ―Holder of the Kingdom, Strength of the Land,‖ May 27, 1966, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,835641-3,00.html. 
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accept UNESCO‘s listing of Preah Vihear.  Be that as it may, in early 2008, the 
Defence Ministry ―alleged that Phnom Penh had ‗made up‘ history to claim the 
ancient Hindu temple of Preah Vihear and get it listed as a United Nations World 
Heritage site.‖  Moreover, ―Cambodia was ―creating ‗false evidence‘ in order to 
claim the historic site for its unilateral benefit.‖49  
However, the Defense Ministry quickly retracted its charges, especially with 
the coming to office of the Samak Sundaravey administration in late January, 2008.  
In March Samak himself visited Cambodia to discuss the temple, among other 
issues. 
The Thai government‘s official position became increasingly clear as the new 
government in Bangkok settled down in office.  According to a foreign ministry 
official in March, ―what concerns Thailand is that Cambodia's proposal also 
include the protection zones ("zonage") surrounding the temple, which extend into 
the said overlapping claimed areas.  To address this issue, both sides are now 
discussing the possibility of joint management of the zones in overlapping claim 
areas….‖50 
According to Thailand‘s Foreign Ministry, while Thailand respects the World 
Court‘s decision on judging Preah Vihear to be part of Cambodia, the ICJ ―did not 
decide on the exact location of the boundary line between Thailand and Cambodia 
in the area.‖  As such, ―Thailand still adheres to a different boundary line and a 
different map than that of Cambodia, resulting in overlapping territorial claims 
over the areas around the Temple of Preah Vihear.
51
 
Underneath the official verbosity, Thai bureaucrats at the Foreign Ministry 
still cringe about the 1962 World Court decision.  ―‘Something tricky happened,‘ 
said ministry spokesman Tharit Charungvat, in reference to the original French 
map.  ‗If you used the watershed to divide the border, Preah Vihear should be on 
Thai territory, but the court ruled that since we never expressed our objection, the 
map flaw was immaterial.‘‖52  
As the Thai government began to finalize its position on the border sanctuary, 
the chief legal expert on the temple, Virachai Plasai, director-general for Treaties 
and Legal Affairs, was suddenly kicked upstairs to an inactive post.  Some saw this 
as punishment for poor performance.  In May, as both sides appeared to be moving 
toward agreement, ahead of the UNESCO meeting in July 2008, the only point of 
contention appeared to be the overlapping area of 4.6 square kilometres around the 
temple - claimed by both sides - which Cambodia has included in its proposal. 
Still, Thailand opposed the proposal since both sides had not yet reached a proper 
solution. Ultimately, three proposals were tabled: 
First, Cambodia would list the temple as a world heritage site without 
changing the status quo of the boundary. Second, the temple would be listed prior 
to a complete border settlement.  Third, a joint regime would administer the site.
53
 
Meanwhile in May, certain Thai and Cambodian newspapers as well as 
elements within the Democrat Party alleged that there were links between progress 
                                                 
49 The Nation. ―Relations Sour Over Preah Vihear Claim,‖ January 25, 2008, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
  
50 Chainarong Keratiyutwong (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), ―Letters to the Editor: Thailand 
and Cambodia will Solve Boundary Issue, The Nation, March 12, 2008, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
  
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand. 2008. ―Understanding the Temple of Preah Vihear 
Issue,‖ [translated from Thai],www.mfa.go.th/internet/information/19648.pdf. 
52 Jansson, Peter. ―Temple in Dispute,” Bangkok Post, June 17, 2008, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com.
  
53 The Nation. ―Border Dispute: Heritage Proposal Site Deadlocked.‖ May 13, 2008. 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
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on Preah Vihear and maritime gas/oil concessions for former PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra.
54
   
Ultimately on May 22, Cambodia and Thailand (represented by Thai FM 
Noppadon Pattama) agreed on Cambodia‘s listing of Preah Vihear Temple as a 
World Heritage Site.
55
  Phnom Penh agreed that the listing would be for the temple 
minus the small 4.6 square kilometer disputed area west of the complex, the status 
of which would be decided in future.  For a visual interpretation of this border 
controversy, see map (Figure 4) below.  The area to the west (left) is the 4.6 square 
kilometers of territory disputed by both sides. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Maps of Thai-Cambodian border near Khao Preah Vihear, showing 
the 4.6 square kilometers of disputed territory.  The first was presented by 
Thailand’s Foreign Ministry56  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 The Nation. ―Noppadon Rejects Claims of Concessions on Temple, The Nation, May 16, 
2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
 
 
55
Joint Communique between Thailand and Cambodia. 2008, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/pdf/jointcommunique.pdf. 
56 For map 1 (from the Thai Foreign Ministry), see Bangkok Post. ―Noppadon Releases 
Map, Claims Success.‖ June 19, 2008, http://www.bangokpost.com.  For map 2, see So, 
Kenneth. ―Preah Vihear: A Khmer Heritage,‖ July 25, 2005, Cambodian Information 
Centre,  
http://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.cambodia.org/Preah_Vihear/images/tha
i_document_map_preah_vih.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.cambodia.org/blogs/editorials/200
8/07/preah-vihear-khmer-heritage.html&usg=__x09a6yRJyUspQ-
Bf4Ovmce9FOTk=&h=532&w=450&sz=52&hl=en&start=7&sig2=cHiqqbLcadr7Bh4DZ
TMJDg&tbnid=ZdGcC1sAAc2iFM:&tbnh=132&tbnw=112&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dmap
%2Bpreah%2Bvihear%26gbv%3D2%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DG&ei=BWTPSuHmJoqkmw
OIy6T-Ag.
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Unfortunately for the Samak government, by May, Thai nationalism had erupted 
and was becoming hard to manage.  The Democrat Party officially registered its 
opposition to allowing Preah Vihear to be registered by UNESCO which might 
include some Thai territory.  Some residents of Srisaket province in Thailand 
protested that Cambodian vendors near the sanctuary were illegally occupying Thai 
territory.  In June Cambodia sent a new map to the Samak government to show the 
boundary.  However the Thai military still argued that Cambodia was encroaching 
on at least 4.6 kilometers of Thai territory.  Still, despite much public opposition 
and ire in the army, Thailand‘s National Security Council approved the new map 
on June 16.  The Thai Foreign Minister claimed that the disputed 4.6 kilometers of 
territory would not be compromised.  Still, the Democrat Party promised to include 
as a reason for an up-coming government censure vote that the Samak 
administration had compromised national security.  Meanwhile, the People‘s 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) anti-Samak/Thaksin protestors also voiced their 
opposition to the Thai government‘s acceptance of the map.57 
By mid-June, 2008, four elite actor positions on Preah Vihear had been 
clarified: the Government opposed by the King‘s Privy Council; the Military (and 
Bureaucrats); the Democrats; and nationalist elements of civil society (e.g. the 
Alliance for Democracy—PAD).  There were also non-aligned academics.  
                                                 
57 Bangkok Post. ―Government Approves Secret Cambodia Temple Deal.‖ June 17, 2008, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com. 
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Following Miles‘ Law, where each stood depended upon where each sat: the 
Samak administration and pro-peace academics prioritizing state-to-state 
cooperation while the other groups prioritized territorial integrity and national 
security.  The Democrats were a special case: had they been in office, they most 
probably would have prioritized cooperation.  But since they were adrift in the 
parliamentary opposition, they supported the view giving them the most political 
advantage—in this case nationalistic confrontation. 
On June 18, the Samak cabinet formally approved Foreign Minister 
Noppadon‘s earlier signing of Cambodia‘s request to make Preah Vihear a World 
Heritage Site.  But on June 27, Thailand‘s Administrative Court issued an 
injunction against this decision, accusing the cabinet of violating Article 190 of the 
Constitution.  Article 190 states that all international treaties must be approved by 
the Lower House of Parliament.  Thereupon, the government agreed to halt its 
support for Cambodia's bid to list Preah Vihear Temple as a Unesco World 
Heritage site.  But on July 7, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee decided to 
accept Cambodia‘s unilateral nomination of Preah Vihear as a World Heritage 
Site.  The Committee directed Cambodia and UNESCO to convene an international 
coordinating committee to safeguard the development of the site.  This committee, 
would have seven additional state members including Thailand.  Still, Bangkok 
feared the other state members might ―gang up‖ on her where Thai and Cambodian 
interests clashed.
58
 Meanwhile, Thailand continued to reserve the right to appeal 
the World Court‘s 1962 decision on Preah Vihear.  More specifically, Bangkok 
again laid claim to the 4.6 square kilometers of land adjacent to Preah Vihear. 
Then, on July 15, three Thai civilians, members of Thailand‘s ultranationalist 
Dharmayatra group, crossed into the area of Preah Vihear, and planted a Thai flag.  
They were immediately arrested by Cambodian troops. 40 [numbers in words] Thai 
troops subsequently entered the area to retrieve these civilians but Cambodia 
detained 17 Thai troops overnight.  These, along with the three Thai civilians were 
quickly released.  But Thai troops begin to reside at Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda 
(Preah Vihear Pagoda) in the 4.6 square kilometer area.  On July 17, Thai and 
Cambodian armies rushed hundreds of troops to the 4.6 square kilometer area of 
disputed territory which is centered upon Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda.  The two sides 
raised their weapons at each other with the Cambodians finally backing down.   
Facing domestic pressure over his stance, Thai PM Samak suddenly began to 
take a more nationalist position.  In a July 18 letter to Cambodian PM Hun Sen, 
Samak insisted that Thai troops were on Thai soil and could reside at Keo Sikha 
Kiri Svara Pagoda as it was on the Thai soil.  He continued that "the establishment 
of the Cambodian community, including construction of a temple and houses, and 
the presence of the Cambodian military personnel in the area constitute a continued 
violation of Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity."
59
  The Thai Foreign 
Ministry meanwhile stated that Thailand had issued four previous written protests 
to Cambodia regarding the establishment of a Cambodian community within 
Thailand straddling Preah Vihear in 2004, 2005, 2007, and 2008 respectively.
60
  
A July 20
th
 meeting between senior Cambodian and Thai military officials 
(through the General Border Committee) failed to resolve the military stand-off.  
Cambodia then asked for assistance from the United Nations Security Council.  But 
the body rejected the request, preferring that the sides try bilateral negotiations.  
                                                 
58 Tulsathit Taptim. ―Preah Vihear: Has Thailand Been Duped?‖ The Nation, July 18, 2008, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
  
59 Supalak Ganjanakhundee. ―Thai Troops are in Thai Territory: Thai PM,‖ The Nation, 
July 19, 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 
60 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ―Situation along the Thai-Cambodian Border in the Area 
Immediately Adjacent to the Temple of Preah Vihear.‖ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Kingdom of Thailand, July 18, 2008, http://www.mfa.go.th/web/2642.php?id=25758.
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Following the July 25 elections in Cambodia, new Thai Foreign Minister Dej 
Bunnag held negotiations with the Cambodian Foreign Minister.  The result of the 
talks was a mutual decision to move toward a redeployment of Thai and 
Cambodian troops from the area.  This meeting seemed to signal a lessening of 
tensions. 
However, in early August, Cambodia and Thailand sparred over another 
temple straddling the Thai-Cambodia border—Ta Muen Thom.  Thailand stated 
that this temple was located in Surin province and stationed troops at the complex 
in preparation for a potential future Thai listing of it as UNESCO World Heritage 
Site.  Adjacent to Ta Muen Thom are two other disputed temples Ta Muen Toch 
and Ta Muen.  According to Bangkok, Thai troops have been stationed at Ta Muen 
Thom at least since 1998 (this author saw them there on a visit to the sanctuary 
during that year).  But Cambodia also claimed sovereignty over the sanctuary.  
Moreover, this was only the tip of the iceberg.  There are perhaps between 10 and 
100 ruins of Khmer temples along the vaguely-marked Thai-Cambodian border.  
One of these, Sadokkokthom temple (which Thailand situates in Sa Kaeo temple 
but which Cambodia has also specifically claimed) could be the center of another 
cross-border crisis.
61
  Beyond that, there is Prasat Bai Baek, which Thailand 
locates in Buriram province, only a few hundred meters from the Thai-Cambodian 
border.   
Despite the continuing tension, by late August, both the Thai and Cambodian 
governments were increasingly showing signs of seeking an end to potential 
hostilities.  A second Foreign Ministers‘ discussion and JBC meeting on August 
18-19 resulted in an interim agreement which began a process of reducing friction.  
More meetings were planned.  Simultaneously, the number of troops in the 
disputed area of Preah Vihear (at least 400 Thai and 800 Cambodian soldiers) was 
gradually being reduced.  But Thailand has maintained its security presence at Ta 
Muen Thom (and reportedly at Sadokkothom), avowing sovereignty over these 
sanctuaries. 
Moreover, on September 10, amidst reports that Cambodia had dispatched 150 
troops to Ta Kwai temple (which Cambodia calls Ta Krabey), Thai soldiers entered 
the ruins.  Ta Kwai is located about 12 kilometres east of the previously-mentioned 
Ta Muen Thom, in southern Surin province, along an ambiguous boundary with 
Cambodia.  After a few days of negotiations, both sides agreed to withdraw troops 
but continued to maintain positions near the area.
62
  On September 14, Phnom Penh 
warned Bangkok publicly that the latter was ―testing her patience‖ in occupying 
this third Cambodian temple.  Indeed, Cambodia threatened to take the dispute to 
an unnamed third international party.  Bangkok responded that Phnom Penh‘s 
allegations were baseless and that Thai troops had always been based near the 
ruin.
63
  In mid-October, some Thai and Cambodian soldiers briefly engaged in 
combat in the vicinity of Preah Vihear.  The incident left six soldiers injured—four 
                                                 
61 
Sadokkokthom, constructed in the 15th century, was registered by the Thai Fine Arts 
Department registered it as a heritage item in 1935.  The department is currently renovating 
the temple. Wichian Bun-udom, chairman of Khok Sung subdistrict (in Sa Kaeo province) 
culture council, said Khok Sung residents hold a religious ritual at the temple each year, 
and he has never seen any Cambodian visiting the temple.  See Bangkok Post. ―Show Us 
Your Proof, Say Tour Guides.,‖ Bangkok Post, August 18, 2008, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com. 
62 
MCOT News. 2008. ―Thai, Cambodian Army Stand-off at Another Disputed Temple 
Ruin,‖ Thai Ministry of Communications and Technology, 
http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=6250.
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Thai and two Cambodian.
64
  Afterwards the Cambodian Prime Minister issued an 
ultimatum for Thai soldiers to withdraw from the area while the Thai government 
beefed up its forces in along the 4.6 square kilometer disputed zone.  The two 
countries agreed upon on joint patrols in the area and stepped up talks to resolve 
the dispute.
65
  However, the ultra-nationalist Thai PAD used the border incident to 
trumpet its calls for the pro-Thaksin Somchai Wongsawat government to resign 
office while Thailand‘s military insisted it would take a more virulent stand toward 
Cambodia. 
On October 30, after months of waiting, the Thai parliament finally gave Thai 
negotiating teams the green light to initiate talks with Cambodia to settle the border 
dispute and demarcate the land boundary.  Parliamentary approval was required by 
the 2007 Constitution's ―Article 190 prior to any negotiation with foreign countries 
that would involve changes in the territory.‖66  
In December 2008, the sudden demise of Thailand‘s ruling People‘s Power 
party and the rise of the Democrats under new Prime Minister Abhisit Vechachiwa 
raised the hopes of Thai nationalists that the new Thai government would share 
PAD perspectives of the border dispute.  But new Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya 
dashed these dreams, stating that ―a return to Thai ownership of the Preah Vihear 
Temple was not an option [though] Thailand would maintain cooperation with 
Cambodia over the historic and controversial Hindu temple.‖67  However, the 
apparent transformation in the Democrats‘ policy toward Preah Vihear from 
nationalist opposition at the crisis‘ outset in June 2008 to favoring cooperation with 
Cambodia upon Abhisit‘s rise to the prime minister-ship at the end of 2008 should 
not have surprised anyone.  Parties in opposition tend to try and capitalize on issues 
of the moment at the ruling coalition‘s expense so the former can replace the latter 
in office.  Moreover, who were the Democrats anyway? Beyond being Thailand‘s 
longest-lasting political party (established in 1946), the party is greatly influenced 
by long-established business interests mostly in the country‘s south as well as in 
Bangkok.
68
 Such interests, as with any businesspeople, would tend to lean toward 
commercial cooperation with other countries.  Examining the Democrat Party 
through this lens, it is not difficult to see then why they underwent an sea-change 
in their perspective toward Preah Vihear. 
It seemed now that Thai nationalist protestors possessed no parliamentary ally.  
Yet Thai nationalism experienced a slight resurgence in April, following yet 
another Thai-Cambodian border clash at the temple, in which soldiers were killed 
on each side.  In May, the Abhisit government warned UNESCO representatives 
not to visit Preah Vihear without Thailand‘s permission.  Further, Abhisit stated 
that Thailand would seek a review of UNESCO‘s inscription as a World Heritage 
site.  Yet over the summer, eventually tensions cooled tremendously.  Thai Deputy 
PM Suthep Thuagsuban met with Cambodian Prime Minister in Cambodia several 
times, helped to inaugurate the construction of a road from the border to Siem 
Reap, Cambodia.
69
  Suthep also expedited a plan to ease the temple crisis, 
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ironically following a proposal suggested by a former Foreign Minister of the pro-
Thaksin Samak government.  Amidst this thaw in glacial border relations, the Joint 
Border Commission (JBC) met for only the second time in 2009, initiating 
procedures for boundary demarcation.  Military chief from both Thailand and 
Cambodia declared that hostilities would henceforth cease.  Cambodia then halved 
its number of forces near Preah Vihear.  But under Article 190 of the Thai 
Constitution, the JBC could not approve a similar military reduction without the 
approval of parliament.  However, the Thai government did declare that the 
entrance to the Preah Vihear temple complex in Thailand would soon be re-
opened.   
Thai supporters of moderation and cooperation towards Cambodia regarding 
Preah Vihear in 2009 include Thai businesspeople, many security-related 
bureaucrats, and most of the Democrat party.  The chairmen of the Ubon 
Ratchathani and Sisaket chambers of commerce had long pleaded for an end to the 
crisis:   
 
 Confusion over the abstract boundary caused unnecessary conflicts over 
 Preah Vihear between both sides…Local people in the area don't care 
 about the boundary. We just want to live in peace and do business.
70
  
 
In October 2009, the Abhisit government appeared to have done an about-face 
from its stance on Preah Vihear when it was in the opposition.  Remember, in June 
2008 he had supported PAD claims that the Samak government had surrendered 
territory to Cambodia.
71
  Now as Prime Minister in 2009, Abhisit stated that 
―Thailand has not lost any territory in the disputed border area.‖72  It appeared now 
that political expediency was defining his perspectives, depending on whether he 
was in government or on the opposition benches. 
As for the opponents of conciliation, the PAD, nationalist elements of civil 
society, rightist military officials, royalists, and many in the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai 
party continue to all be included in this group.  On September 19, 2009, a group of 
PAD militants attempted to storm the 4.6 kilometer disputed area, demanding that 
all Cambodians immediately depart.  The militants even engaged in violent clashes 
with Thai villagers in the area as the former tried to make their advance.  In the 
end, some PAD leaders broke through near the border area where they were 
allowed by Thai army officials to read a statement.  The declaration stated that 
Preah Vihear and the areas around it were ―within Thailand's territory in reference 
to the border demarcation in 1904.‖73  PM Abhisit and PM Hun Sen (of Cambodia) 
have since traded more accusations against each other though Abhisit insists he is 
looking for a peace resolution.   
Meanwhile, Thailand‘s military has most recently appeared to show a 
moderate stance towards this dispute.  In late September, Army Chief Anupong 
Paochinda declared that Thailand would use only dialogue to end the conflict while 
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any Cambodians trespassing into Thailand would be treated in accordance to 
human rights standards.
74
 
However, in an interesting twist, the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party (now in the 
parliamentary opposition) has apparently sought to hinder Abhisit in his quest for a 
lessening of border friction.  Indeed, PT has delayed parliamentary sessions which 
are necessary in order to obtain parliamentary ratification of the JBC border talks.  
Clearly, now that it is leading the opposition in the Lower House, PT is taking 
more a nationalist position toward Preah Vihear than it did when it led the 
government.  This takes us back to Miles Law: where one stands depends on where 
one sits.  As with the Democrat Party in its changed perspective once it replaced 
the pro-Thaksin PT as the dominant party in the ruling coalition, so too has PT, 
now in the opposition, partially altered its perspective in order to capitalize on the 
ruling coalition‘s perceived failures in dealing with Cambodia. 
On September 29, 2009, Thailand‘s National Anti-Corruption Commission 
indicted ex-Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and his then-foreign minister, 
Noppadon Pattama, of malfeasance regarding their cabinet‘s 2008 decision to 
endorse Cambodia‘s decision to unilaterally inscribe Preah Vihear temple as a 
World Heritage site since the government failed to seek parliament‘s permission 
(per Article 190 of the 2007 constitution).
75
  Thereupon, in the final days of 
December, the Central Administrative Court annulled the Samak Sundaravej 
Cabinet's June 17, 2008 decision to endorse Cambodia's unilateral application to 
name Preah Vihear Temple as a UN World Heritage Site given that there was no 
prior parliamentary approval based on Article 190.
76
  
Ultimately, the 2008-9 Thai-Cambodian revival of tensions over Preah Vihear 
has created a domino effect, extending to other temples along the only occasionally 
marked boundary separating Thailand from Cambodia.  Though negotiations to 
properly delineate the border have commenced, they have been difficult.  Both 
ASEAN and the United Nations have almost been drawn into the crisis.  Currently, 
frontier friction remains high.  
 
 
IV. Elites’ Perspectives on the Four Cases 
 
To scrutinize the perceptions of Thai actors towards Thai-Cambodian frontier 
problems, interviews were conducted with individuals representing four groups of 
players, each deemed to be relevant in influencing Thai foreign policy because of 
their proximity to the center of Thai political power.  The goal was to gauge these 
actors‘ perceptions and explanations for these views.  Another important goal was 
to see how closely the standpoints reflected those in the literature.  The four groups 
included Traditional Powers (Privy Council and military); Pro-Thaksin political 
parties (mostly Palang Prachachon/Puea Thai); anti-Thaksin political parties 
(Prachatipat or the Democrat Party); and Extra-Parliamentary Forces 
(demonstrators [People‘s Alliance for Democracy], academics, and journalists).  It 
is worth noting that with regard to the political parties examined (particularly the 
Democrats), their views have not always remained unchanged.  Where a political 
party has participated in the ruling coalition it has tended toward a certain 
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perspective whereas when it is in the opposition it has tended toward the 
opposite—perhaps to score political points.  In this section, I offer the results of the 
interviews, proceeding from the center of state power to civil society, and generally 
shifting from hardliners to moderates to a non-cohesive group of views.  Moreover, 
the study divides this section into sub-sections based upon the four cases (in the 
same order as the previous section) and then tells how each of the interviewees 
responded to each of these cases.  The only pressing border issues appeared to be 
Preah Vihear and other border temples as well as the sea boundary. 
 
 
Case I: Aranyaprathet-Poipet  
 
Traditional Powers (Privy Council and military)  
 
This group was wary of Thais crossing into Poipet from Aranyaprathet beginning 
in October 2008 supporting tighter security measures in Aranyaprathet.  This was 
due to the tense nature of Thai-Cambodian relations at Preah Vihear during that 
time.  Exemplifying this security-oriented tendency, one Thai state official at 
Aranyaprathet warned Thai nationals not to cross into Cambodia through the 
border checkpoint unless it was vital for them to do so.
77
  
 
 
Pro-Thaksin political parties (mostly Palang Prachachon/Puea Thai) 
 
The predominant view has been one of welcoming the expansion of trade and joint 
projects in the Aranyaprathet-Poipet area.  Indeed the TRT/PPP governments of 
Thaksin, Samak and Somchai have worked with the Cambodian government to 
further develop a Special Cross-border Economic Zone in order to create a 
manufacturing-based, international twin city.
78
  However, since the onset of the 
Preah Vihear crisis, such plans have slowed down, though the border remains open 
and trade continues to freely flow.  Still, the current government has not expressed 
any desire to downgrade relations along the border at Aranyaprathet-Poipet.
79
   
 
 
Anti-Thaksin political parties (Prachatipat or the Democrat Party) 
 
The Democrats have voiced no specific opinion about Thai-Cambodian relations in 
the area of Aranyaprathet-Poipet.  The party, in agreement with the government, 
has supported trade expansion along the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
Economic Corridor, and the transportation linkages which run through this bi-city 
area are an important leg of the southern GMS Economic Corridor.
80
  
 
 
Extra-Parliamentary Forces (demonstrators, academics, and journalists) 
 
As for hardline extra-parliamentary views, Sondhi Limthongkul of People‘s 
Alliance for Democracy stated that part of the solution to the problem of Thai-
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Cambodian border tensions would be to inform ―Thai people doing business along 
the border [that they] must be … prepared for border closures  (including the 
checkpoint at Aranyaprathet-Poipet), in case the [Preah Vihear] conflict 
escalates.‖81  With regard to pragmatic-progressive extra-parliamentary views, 
Akarapong Khamkoon would find the continuing peace at Aranyaprathet-Poipet to 
be an example of what he calls ―border as a destination or border as modification.‖  
This given that the twin city area is continuing to be transformed into a nexus of 
―peaceful conciliation.‖82 
 
 
Case II: The Emerald Triangle  
 
Traditional Powers (Privy Council and military)  
 
In interviews and other sources, respondents representing Traditional Powers have 
not specifically spoken about the Thai-Cambodian situation at the Emerald 
Triangle.  One source, an anonymous high-ranking general, did emphasize the need 
for the Thai government to remain ―vigilant‖ along its entire borderline with 
Cambodia, especially given that these borders are not thoroughly demarcated.
83
 
 
 
Pro-Thaksin political parties (mostly the Palang Prachachon/Puea Thai) 
 
In late March, 2008, Thai Tourism and Sports Minister Weerasak Kohsurat said 
that the Samak government was looking forward to closer cooperation for the 
expansion of trade and investment in the tri-border area.  He added that ―there were 
no problems regarding relations between the three neighboring countries.‖84  In 
October, with tensions high over Preah Vihear, the same PPP government (this 
time led by Somchai Wongsawat) noted its ―concern‖ about Cambodian troop 
movements near the Emerald Triangle.
85
  Thus the government continues to 
promote trade in the area but is becoming more cautious.  
 
 
Anti-Thaksin political parties (Prachatipat or the Democrat Party) 
 
In interviews and other sources, representatives of the Democrat Party have not 
voiced an opinion with specific reference to the Emerald Triangle.  They have, 
however, emphasized the need for a quicker and clearer demarcation of the Thai-
Cambodian border.
86
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 Quoted in Prachathai. ―Sondhi Limthongkul‘s Solution to the Preah Vihear Dispute,‖ 
August 2, 2008,  http://prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=732.  
82 
Personal interview with Akharapong Khamkoon of Thammasat University, August 18, 
2008.
 
83
 Personal interview with an anonymous retired senior Army general, August 4, 2008. 
84
 ASEANAffairs.com. ―Thailand/Emerald Triangle: Thai Govt to Revive Tourism 
Cooperation Drive.‖ March 30, 2008,  
http://www.aseanaffairs.com/thailand_emerald_triangle_thai_govt_to_revive_tourism_coo
peration_drive.  
85
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand. Press Release: Thailand Protests Cambodia 
(October 22, 2008).  
http://diplomacymonitor.com/stu/dm.nsf/dn/dn7EC1E34956032AAC852574E900426E56.  
86
 Personal interview with M.R. Sukhumphand Paribatra, October 10, 2008. 
Paul W. Chambers and Siegfried O. Wolf 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  5 2 ,  F e b r u a r y  2 0 1 0                                                 28 
Extra-Parliamentary Forces (demonstrators, academics, and journalists) 
 
Hard-line respondents from this group include M.L.
87
 Walwipa Charoonroj, a 
historian at Thammasat University.  She argues that given the experiences of Thai-
Cambodian relations at Preah Vihear, the Thai government should be very 
cautious about making deals with Cambodia in other border areas.
88
  Representing 
pragmatic/progressive elements of extra-parliamentary forces, Charnvit Kasetsiri 
states that ―Let's have a free-flow border.  Let's have people-to-people relations, 
especially people along the border, including Ubon-Srisaket-Surin-Khorat down to 
Srakeo, Chantaburi, Trat, to their counter parts in Khet Preah Vihear, Khet Udar 
Meanchay, Khet Bontey Meanchay, Koh Kong, etc.‖89 He exemplifies those who 
support the building of closer bridges between Thailand and Cambodia in the area 
of the Emerald Triangle.
90
 
 
 
Case III: The Sea Border 
 
Traditional Powers (Privy Council and military) 
 
With regard to Thailand‘s perceptions regarding the maritime dispute, there have 
been differences of opinion among traditional power-holders.  For example, 
Admiral Prateep Chuen-arom, representing a more hawkish wing of the military 
(which constitutes the majority opinion), has stated that ―‘If Thailand carelessly 
handles the issue of the Preah Vihear temple, the country might lose other parts of 
its territory, including disputed waters in the Gulf of Thailand.‘‖91  He continued 
that the Cambodian government had granted permission to companies from France, 
the United States, China and England to explore for gas and petroleum along the 
disputed maritime area.
92
  These countries, he added, were ready to ―extend their 
support to Cambodia if border conflicts between Phnom Penh and Bangkok rage 
on or escalate into a crisis.‖  Prateep ―urged the government to come up with 
strategies to foster ties with these powerful countries under the framework of 
sovereignty and economic development.‖93  
Meanwhile, Thanom Charoenlaph, a former director-general of the 
Hydrographic Department and a senior adviser to the Thailand Institute of Marine 
Affairs Development, more pragmatically proposed that the two countries set up ―a 
joint development area committee to solve the problem.  The committee would be 
akin to the Malaysia-Thai joint development area, which has been active in gas 
exploration...‖94 Thanom‘s advice is closer to that of Thai academics, 
businesspeople, and politicians close to the ruling People‘s Power Party.  
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Ultimately, resolution of the maritime boundary dispute, potentially beneficial to 
both Thailand and Cambodia, could take a long time to settle.  Furthermore, Krairit 
Nilkuha, the director –general of Thailand‘s Department of Mineral Fuels, is 
optimistic that negotiations over the maritime dispute can be disputed soon.  He 
sees production from the maritime petroleum fields beginning within 10 years.
95
   
 
 
Pro-Thaksin political parties (mostly the Palang Prachachon/Puea Thai) 
 
With regard to the maritime boundary disagreement, the view of pro-government 
politicians has been to promote ―forward engagement,‖ a foreign policy initiative 
meant to foster closer business ties and thus closer bilateral relations.  Viraphand 
Vacharathit, the Thai Ambassador to Cambodia for the People Power Party (PPP) 
government during 2007-8, stated that prospects for Thai-Cambodian maritime 
boundary talks for coming to a resolution were bright, especially since Thailand 
and Cambodia could utilize the benefit-sharing model of the Thai-Malaysian Joint 
Development Area (JDA), which had been established since 1990.
96
 
 
 
Anti-Thaksin political parties (Prachatipat or the Democrat Party)  
 
The view of the Democrats, in the words of Democrat deputy leader and former 
Deputy Foreign Minister M.R.
97
  Sukhumphand Paribatra, is that ―Thailand and 
Cambodia must agree on a maritime boundary.‖  He adds that ―The Preah Vihear 
crisis has [meanwhile] made it more difficult to share and exploit oil profits from 
the sea.‖ He continues: 
 
There is still a question of the division of income from the undersea resources 
within the disputed sea area.  In lieu of a signed agreement, there has been a 
formula to simply divide the resources either 50/50, 90/10, or 10/90.  Though 
it might seem equitable to distribute in a 50/50 manner, the reserves exist 
nearer to the Thai side of the disputed maritime area. So there should be a 
more appropriate distribution.  Of course there was speculation that a conflict 
of interest existed between Noppadon‘s agreement with the Cambodian 
government and Thaksin‘s interests in the maritime areas, there has been no 
proof.  There is much less certainty about this.
98
 
 
 
Extra-Parliamentary Forces (demonstrators, academics, and journalists) 
 
With regard to extra-parliamentary forces, the People‘s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD) as well as a minority of academics tended to be the most hardline and 
reactionary.  For example, a PAD leader told this author the following: 
 
As for the maritime boundary dispute, [former Prime Minister] Thaksin 
Shinawatra was willing to compromise national interests here as well as on 
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Khao Preah Vihear in order to gain access to natural gas and other business 
interests in the maritime boundary area.  Ultimately, when we look at Thai-
Cambodian boundary problems, they involve four factors: politics, 
civilization, personal interest, and nationalism.
99
 
 
 
Another PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul, opined the following: 
 
We would order the Defense Ministry to build a naval base at Koh Kut, 
deploy two battleships there, together with patrol ships, build a runway for F-
16 aircraft, abolish the committee which oversees demarcation of overlapping 
sea areas, and officially declare our own marine map.
100
 
 
 
Meanwhile, historian M.L. Walwipa Charoonroj of Thammasat University was 
interviewed to glean her perspective.  She stated the following: 
 
As for the disputed maritime border, Thailand cannot give in to Cambodian 
moves to extend their boundary.  Thaksin gave in on Khao Preah Vihear in 
return for interests in border maritime areas.  How then do we resolve the 
Thai-Cambodian border problems?  There are four ways: 
 
1) Cancel any moves which might give land or territory to Cambodia. 
2) Use diplomacy and work hard in security affairs. 
3) If possible, the militaries of Thailand and Cambodia should work together 
to resolve border problems. 
4) A new, capable Foreign Minister should try hard to reveal everything about 
potential conflicts of interest.
101
 
 
 
Still, most Thai academics promote serious bilateral cooperation to resolve frontier 
friction.  Charnvit Kasetsiri, another historian from Thammasat University, 
represents this view.  Regarding the current sea border dispute, Charnvit stated that 
―it will be problematic because of oil and gas, i.e. money.‖  When asked whether 
there was a possible conflict of interest between Thaksin‘s economic interests 
along the sea border and potential concessions by the current Thai government at 
Preah Vihear, Charnvit answered, ―I guess so but the matter is very complicated 
and it might be the other way round, or even up-side down. Some investigation 
should be done on this.‖He did not believe that Thailand had given any 
―concessions‖ at Preah Vihear.102 
 
Another progressive academic view towards the sea border is that of 
Akharapong Khamkoon, yet another historian from Thammasat University.  He 
says the following: 
 
Aside from the land border, the sea boundary is not clear. Thailand and 
Cambodia need a third party to help resolve this issue.  Malaysia-Singapore 
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could be a precedent.  In that situation, a lighthouse was the key.  In the Thai-
Cambodian ocean border dispute, everything depends on what the Joint 
Border Commission decides.  If not, there is ASEAN.
103
 
 
 
As for people in the media, many followed the temper of the times.  Otherwise, 
their position often depended on whether their medium was more closely affiliated 
with or against the ruling coalition.  A certain number supported diplomacy to 
resolve differences.  Such a solution was endorsed by Thepchai Yong, noted 
journalist and currently head of Thai Public Broadcasting Service (TPBS).  
Moreover, in an interview, he stated the following: 
 
The perception of a conflict of interest between Thaksin‘s building of a casino 
on Koh Kong and the situation in Khao Preah Vihear clearly increases doubt 
for the credibility of the PPP-led government. Unfortunately, some Thai 
media have helped to stir up nationalist sentiment regarding the border 
situation with Cambodia.
104
 
 
 
Thai businesspeople tended to agree with pragmatic elements of Thailand‘s extra-
parliamentary forces that cooperation through diplomacy was the best solution to 
Thailand‘s sea border disputes. 
 
 
Case IV: The Thai-Cambodian Land Boundary: Khao Phra Viharn (Preah Vihear) 
and Other Border Temples 
 
Traditional Power Holders (Privy Council and military): 
 
Traditional forces appear to be somewhat divided between ultra-nationalists and 
restrained pragmatists on the issue of Preah Vihear.  One retired senior military 
source stated the following: ―Khao Preah Vihear has belonged to Cambodia since 
the World Court decision in 1962.  But there is 4.6 square kilometers of nearby 
territory which belongs to Thailand.  The temple continues to be a big problem but 
the military supports continued negotiations.‖105  The source continued, however, 
that any negotiations would be held from a position of strength and that Thailand 
would never compromise her sovereignty rights. 
Kraisak Chunhaven, son of former Prime Minister General Chatchai 
Chunhaven stated the following: that ―nationalism has been the easiest issue to 
unite the country especially since 1932.  Such nationalism led to the expansion of 
Thai borders by force.  Soldiers were supposed to sacrifice themselves in the name 
of nationalism.‖  Given that ―the military sees itself as the defender of Thai 
nationalism,‖ it has been supportive of a hard-line nationalist policy toward 
Cambodia, for example in the issue of Preah Vihear.
106
  In Kraisak‘s view, the 
Thai Foreign Ministry has been rather harsh in its policy towards Phnom Penh, 
reflecting an ultra-nationalist perspective.  Many of these officials have told him 
that Cambodians ―should not be spoiled.‖107  Despite the fact that traditional power 
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holders today include both ultra-nationalists and restrained pragmatists, an overall 
attitude of confrontation has tended to reign supreme within this elite group. 
 
With regard to this traditionalist inclination to be reactionary, Thai military 
expert Panitan Wattahayagorn stated that, for Thailand‘s establishment, 
particularly the military, there have been three cardinal rules regarding Preah 
Vihear: 
 
1. Get the temple back. 
2. If it is impossible to get the temple, do all that is possible to put Thailand 
in an advantageous position regarding the temple (e.g. take back adjacent 
territory) 
3. Whatever happens, do not retreat 
 
 
Panitan continued that military perceptions have been guided by the need to 
preserve Thai national security as much as possible.
108
 
 
 
Pro-Thaksin political parties (mostly Palang Prachachon/Puea Thai): 
 
These pro-Thaksin politicians adopted a perception of ardent cooperation with the 
Cambodian government to resolve disputes regarding Thai-Cambodian frontier 
temples. Regarding Preah Vihear temple, the PPP ruling coalition in 2008 sought 
to come to an agreement with Cambodia which would prove to be a win-win 
situation for both Thailand and Cambodia.  On July 18, 2008, Thai Foreign 
Minister Noppadon Pattama stated that Thailand had not lost a single square 
centimeter of territory, given that the new map created by Cambodia for proposing 
Preah Vihear to UNESCO as a World Heritage site claimed nothing beyond what 
had already been granted to Cambodia in 1962.  
 
Cambodia honoured an agreement reached in Paris last month to propose only 
the temple and did not include the overlapping area claimed by both sides, 
Noppadon told a press conference yesterday. Lt-General Daen Meechu-at, 
chief of the Supreme Command's Royal Thai Survey Department  stated that a 
ground survey conducted from June 9-11, 2008, using a satellite based Global 
Positioning System indicated the new map did not claim any part of Thai 
territory. The nearest point, the left corner of the temple, is 3 metres away 
from Thai territory, while the farthest point is 30 metres away, he said. "The 
questioned naga stairs is 10 metres away from the Thai boundary," he said, "I 
confirm there is no part of Cambodia's claim on Thai soil.
109
 
 
 
Both the Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat governments have pushed 
for greater diplomatic efforts to bilaterally resolve the frontier temples issue.  At 
the same time, beginning in October the violent clashes with Cambodia near Preah 
Vihear as well as the related PAD-encouraged Thai nationalism compelled each 
government to adopt a more confrontational attitude toward the Hun Sen 
government.  When the Democrat-led coalition under PM Abhisit government 
assumed office in late December 2008, the latter eventually sought greater 
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cooperation with Cambodia.  As such, PPP, now re-named Puea Thai (PT), shifted 
course on its Preah Vihear perspective.  As such, PT accused the Abhisit 
government of ineptness in handling relations with Cambodia over the issue, by 
both conceding too much on Cambodian demands or objecting to Cambodia's 
unilateral listing of the Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site which  had 
damaged relations with Cambodia.
110
  Political expediency, in terms of PT‘s new 
role as leader of the parliamentary opposition, was perhaps behind PT‘s changed 
stance. 
 
 
Anti-Thaksin Political Parties (Prachatipat or the Democrat Party): 
 
This group has tended to blame the ruling coalition (when a pro-Thaksinparty has 
led the government) for continuing Thai-Cambodian border difficulties.  The point 
for Prachatipat is that PPP is to blame.  The implication is that the Democrats 
would do a better job leading the ruling coalition.  Indeed, Prachatipat attacked the 
government throughout the summer of 2008 given the latter‘s apparently less than 
adequate abilities to protect Thai sovereignty.  In one parliamentary session, 
Democrat Party Leader Abhisit Vechachiwa accused the administration of 
compromising the country's sovereignty with its "active support" for Phnom Penh's 
bid to secure World Heritage status for Preah Vihear. He said no Thai government 
had ever officially accepted the 1962 decision by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), and maintained that the country had the right to revive its claim to the 10th 
century Hindu temple if and when new evidence surfaces.  The Democrat Party 
leader said that with the exception of the Samak government, no Thai government 
had ever regarded the ICJ ruling as the determination of the national border 
between the two sides.  The opposition leader showed a joint communiqué, 
revealing Samak's "active support" for Cambodia's bid for World Heritage status 
for the historic temple.  Former deputy foreign minister Sukhumband Paribatra said 
that the joint communiqué signed by Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama and 
Cambodia's Deputy Prime Minister Sok An could be deemed an international 
treaty, which required a Parliament reading in accordance with article 190 of the 
Constitution.  "Of course, the interpretation is debatable but as long as it is unclear, 
why don't we put it through the Parliament first?  Why does the government make 
it in secret and in a hurry?" he asked.  Abhisit said it was a big mistake on the part 
of the Samak government to stray from the positions of previous governments that 
called for the two countries to put in a joint application.  He also criticised 
Noppadon for misleading the public by proclaiming himself a hero, reportedly for 
succeeding in getting Cambodia to delete the 4.6-square-kilometre disputed area 
from its map submitted to UNESCO.
111
  Ultimately the Democrats led a vote of 
non-confidence (which failed) against Foreign Minister Noppodon Pattama and 
even filed impeachment charges against him.  According to DP party executive 
Kasit Piromya, Thai-Cambodian border relations have been abysmal under the 
current PPP administration.   
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It is too secretive a government, especially with regard to Khao Preah Vihear.  
From the first the Democrats said that PPP must report to the parliament 
about Khao Preah Vihear.  There needs to be clarity.  There needs to be a 
joint Thai-Cambodian application of Khao Preah Vihear’s inscription, not 
Cambodia‘s nomination alone.  Half of the issue is in the disputed area.  With 
regard to this issue, Samak‘s government needs to put the horse before the 
cart, not the cart before the horse.
112
 
 
 
Finally, M.R. Sukhumphand Paribatra, former Deputy Foreign Minister and current 
DP party executive stated that the MOU which Noppadon Pattama signed with the 
Cambodian government should have first been submitted to the Parliament for 
approval under Article 190 of the 2007 Constitution.  He continues:  
 
The agreement [Noppadon] reached was based on speculation and ambiguity.  
The Cambodians were allowed to draw up the map at will.  A lot of people of 
people were afraid that this might be a repeat of the Khao Preah Vihear case.  
Since 1962 Thailand did not say anything about the case so maybe there 
shouldn‘t be a basis for the claim.  In the future, we may forfeit the territory if 
we don‘t say anything.  Noppadon chose to move too quickly and there was 
no transparency.  With no transparency, it is easy to think that Noppadon had 
a hidden agenda.  The status of the area around the ruins of Preah Vihear 
would be designated as a national park by UNESCO.  This would include the 
disputed 4.6 square kilometers of adjacent territory.  So if one day the Thai 
government wanted to give a building permit on part of that area, it would be 
unable to.  Thus Thais have a genuine fear of conceding sovereignty.
113
 
 
 
In October 2008, as both countries stepped up negotiations and Preah Vihear 
increasingly dropped from the media‘s attention, the Democrats appeared to 
support more diplomacy to resolve tensions relating to the disputed territory and 
temples.  For example, the Democrats reflected that despite Noppadon‘s faults, 
Article 190 of the 2007 Constitution was an impediment to diplomacy and voiced 
uncertainty about conflicts of interest in terms of Preah Vihear and the maritime 
border.
114
 
In September 2009, now leading a ruling coalition, the Democrats under new 
PM Abhisit Vechachiwa and Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya found themselves 
seeking to live up to the anti-Cambodian nationalist rhetoric they had earlier 
preached (in conjunction with the PAD), while at the same time desirous of 
improving ties with the Cambodian government.  As such, both Abhisit and Kasit 
changed their polemics completely.  For instance, now Abhisit was saying that 
Thailand had not lost any territory to Cambodia.
115
  The changed perspective could 
most likely be rationalized in terms of political interest given that the Democrats‘ 
role as leading the political opposition had shifted to leading the ruling coalition. 
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Extra-Parliamentary Forces (demonstrators, academics, and journalists): 
 
This group‘s position is not cohesive given that these forces are divided between 
ultra-nationalists and pragmatic progressives on the issue of Preah Vihear.  
Various views are expressed below. The PAD has taken a nationalistic line toward 
the Khmer sanctuary.  They have consistently criticized the Samak government for 
abiding by Cambodia‘s listing of Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage site.  
As such, the PAD has characterized PM Samak‘s first Foreign Minister Noppodon 
Pattama and Samak himself as traitors out to sell the nation.  PAD leaders led 
thousands of followers to Thailand‘s Temple of the Emerald Buddha (the most 
important royal temple in the country).  There they prayed to the image to restore 
Preah Vihear to Thailand.
116
  One PAD leader, in an interview with this author, 
stated: 
 
Khao Preah Vihear is a victim of France.  France designed an unfair map that 
Thailand was forced to sign.  Khao Preah Vihear has become a spiritual 
center for both Thailand and Cambodia.  Naturally Thais are nationalist about 
it and they should be.  Yes, it is difficult to resolve the Khao Preah Vihear 
issue.  But we support soldiers fighting to protect Thai territory.  And yes, it is 
Thai territory.  When we look at Thai-Cambodian boundary problems, they 
involve four factors: politics, civilization, personal interest, and 
nationalism.
117
      
 
 
The issue of Preah Vihear, the adjacent territory, and other frontier temples has 
caused sizeable differences within Thailand‘s academic community.  Some 
conservative, more royalist-oriented academics have taken a more reactionary line 
to Thai-Cambodian border disputes.  Historian M.L. Walwipa Charoonroj of 
Thammasat University is one such person.  In an interview with her, she stated the 
following: 
 
In March 2008, Noppadon Pattama said that the Thai people should cooperate 
and have Cambodia get a UNESCO inscription over Khao Preah Vihear.  We 
can‘t believe Noppadon.  It is not true what the Samak government said about 
Khao Preah Vihear.  The Ministry of Defense initially just wanted opponents 
to shut up.  Some Europeans mapping mainland Southeast Asia in the past 
have indeed included Khao Preah Vihear on the Thai side of the frontier.  
And, if you talk to people living in the area of Khao Preah Vihear, they will 
tell you that Khao Preah Vihear is Thailand‘s lost land.   The UNESCO 
inscription by Cambodia is assisting in this.  If former Foreign Minister 
Noppadon Pattama is not a traitor or corrupt (for agreeing to the UNESCO 
inscription), what is he?  As for villagers living nearby Khao Preah Vihear, 
they are worried that the opening up of Khao Preah Vihear will mean that 
cheaper rice will be dumped into Thailand from Cambodia here.  Clearly [the 
pro-Thaksin] PPP and Hun Sen‘s CPP have a conflict of interest—a deal 
regarding Khao Preah Vihear.  The deal over Khao Preah Vihear would have 
simply helped PPP.  PPP tried to fool everyone.  National security should be 
the most important goal.  Cambodia‘s UNESCO listing of Khao Preah Vihear 
does not assist Thailand‘s national security.  By the way, the World Court 
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failed to rule on the exact Thai-Cambodia boundary back in 1962.  How then 
do we resolve the Thai-Cambodian border problems?  There are four ways: 
 
1) Cancel any moves which might give land to Cambodia. 
2) Use diplomacy and work hard in security affairs. 
3) If possible, the militaries of Thailand and Cambodia should work together 
to resolve border problems. 
4) A new, capable Foreign Minister should try hard to reveal everything about 
potential conflicts of interest.
118
 
 
 
Other Thai academics appear much more eager for cooperation with Cambodia 
than Walwipa.  Exemplifying these are the views of historians Charnvit Kasertsiri 
and Akharapong Khamkoon, both of Thammasat University. 
According to Charnvit, the crisis at Preah Vihear will remain problematic for 
a long time to come and eventually diplomacy will find a solution.  He adds that 
―many I guess, ten, maybe‖ temples along the Thai-Cambodian border could 
potentially be in dispute. 
Charnvit did not think that former Foreign Minister Noppodon Pattama was a 
―traitor‖ for signing the May 2008 memorandum.  ―My guess is that he is not 
sensitive enough to understand this almost century-old Thai military-bureaucratic 
ultra-nationalism and irredentism which is now mixed and used with royal 
nationalism.‖  To resolve the Thai-Cambodian border crisis, Charnvit suggested 
that the overlapping Preah Vihear area be declared a ‗Peace-Land‘ to be developed 
for common people.  ―Let's have a free-flow border.  Let's have people-to-people 
relations, especially people along the border, Ubon-Srisaket-Surin-Khorat down to 
Srakeo, Chantaburi, Trat to their counter parts in Khet Preah Vihear-Khet Udar 
Meanchay, Khet Bontey Meanchay, Koh Kong, etc., not leaving the matter just 
Government-to-Government or just Bangkok to Phnom Penh.  As for what 
percentage of Thai people might be seeking a negotiated peaceful conciliation as 
opposed to nationalistic confrontation, Charnvit‘s guess was that the percentage of 
pro-peace Thais was ―very low…We, present-day Thai (not Siamese), have been 
planted with this ultra-nationalistic emotion since the late 1930s, repeated and 
reproduced in the 1960s and again, right now, this minute.  It is very difficult for 
this to be undone.  Many of us, academics, journalists, military and bureaucratic 
personnel, are deep inside this black hole.  But I don‘t think the business people or 
the younger generations should be included.  They must have different way of 
seeing the Preah Vihear case.‖119  Echoing Charnvit, Akharapong stated the 
following: 
 
Along the 800 kms of the Thai-Cambodian border there are three relationships 
that we analyze: border as barrier, border as destination, border as 
modification.  These bring forth competing meanings of the border.  If the 
Thai government considers the border as a barrier, then there is a problem.  
But a border as a destination or modification presents no problem.  
Unfortunately, preserving the border is meant to defend national security and 
national reputation. 
In my opinion, Thailand and Cambodia need a peaceful conciliation. 
Cambodia made a mistake in signing the MOU with Noppadon.  Originally 
when the MOU was signed, Cambodia was given the right by Thailand to 
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inscribe the exact land at the Khao Preah Vihear.  But the MOU implicitly 
gave away the right of Cambodia to control the disputed 4.6 sq kms near 
Preah Vihear. When Thailand‘s administrative court placed an injunction on 
the MOU, it freed Cambodia from this obligation. Walwipa and other Thai 
ultranationalists say: ―We cannot lose any land to Cambodia because our 
ancestors shed blood for it.‖  They are misguided.  Meanwhile, the PAD 
twisted Noppadon‘s signature on its head. Cambodia uses the border temple 
issues as political manipulation, domestic politics. 
Certainly the 4.6 sq kms is a tool of Thailand‘s traditional forces to destroy 
Thaksin.  How do we resolve these problems?  First, the disputed 4.6 sq kms 
should be a ―peace-land‖ governed by both countries.  There should be a 
management process without demarcation.  This is the perfect opportunity for 
Thai people to understand Thai culture vis-à-vis Cambodian culture.  Thailand 
can use Preah Vihear as a tool to make peaceful conciliation.
120
 
 
 
Naruemon Thabchumpon, offers yet another academic viewpoint.  She stresses the 
plight of Srisaket entrepreneurs in the Preah Vihear border dispute: 
 
With regard to Khao Preah Vihear, the military has lost much face in its 
struggle in apparently siding with the PPP government on the UNESCO 
inscribing of the temple.  There is probably a conflict of interest regarding 
Koh Kong.  But the People‘s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) created a kind of 
ultra-nationalism over these ambiguous border issues.  The PAD sought to use 
Khao Preah Vihear to bring down PPP MP Samak Sundaravej.  Moreover, 
local entrepreneurs in Srisaket are left with a big problem have a problem if 
Khao Preah Vihear remains closed.  They will lose much money.  Besides 
that, nationalism is dangerous.
121
   
 
 
Aside from academics, Thailand‘s media has been divided over Thai-Cambodian 
frontier problems.  Thai television and radio stations, dominated by the state and 
government viewpoints, have tended to be rather reactionary. But some 
independent media have also shown a nationalist disposition.  This has included the 
newspapers Daily News and Puchagan.  Some periodicals such as Thai Post, 
Bangkok Post, and The Nation, have, however, been more even-handed.  Thepchai 
Yong, noted journalist and currently head of Thai Public Broadcasting Service 
(TPBS) offers a pragmatic view: 
 
Khao Preah Vihear was not an issue at all in the past, so it ―caught‖ to some 
extent the media by surprise.  The temple issue became part of the anti-
Thaksin cause as the ―bigger issue‖ – Thaksin‘s conflict of interest with 
Cambodia.  The government handled the issue so badly (too rushed and 
hasty).  Both Thailand and Cambodia need to get diplomacy rolling, 
especially to reduce tensions vis-à-vis the media.
122
 
 
 
Meanwhile, noted Thai media rights advocate Supinya Klangnarong stated the 
following: 
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Khao Preah Vihear has been a case where the People‘s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD) has been able to mobilize society.   The temple was only 
an ―instrument‖, not the cause.  Thailand‘s media is transmitting nationalist 
sentiments around PV – media are eager to reproduce stereotypes, not to 
analyze the case.  The electronic media (TV) tends to transmit the 
government‘s view, while the print media tend to ―support‖ the PAD‘s view.  
One reason why the PAD is able to exploit the PV issue – the government 
lacks the ability to explain the issue to the public; the PAD actually is more 
successful than the PAD to get its voice out. In the case of Preah Vihear, 
suddenly people got interested in Preah Vihear and ‗wanted PV back‘ – a 
paradigmatic case of agenda-setting and mobilizing nationalist sentiment. 
However, following [unrelated domestic violence], Thailand‘s media is now 
trying to ―calm down‖ the situation.  If PAD and the media would not 
―rekindle‖ the issue, the public would lose any interest in the Preah Vihear 
temple. Since other events overshadow the PV issue (i.e., Thaksins return to 
England), the issue is already slowing down.  The bottom line is that Preah 
Vihear is only relevant as a ―trigger issue‖ to get society mobilized against the 
government.
123
 
 
 
As for the perception of Thai businesses towards border problems involving 
frontier temples and adjacent territory, the general consensus has been to work 
towards a cooperative arrangement.  Narongchai Akrasanee, executive chairman of 
the Export-Import Bank of Thailand, stated that the bank supported the Thai 
private sector in investing abroad, particularly Cambodia.  "We should separate the 
dispute about Preah Vihear Temple from business. Cooperation between Thailand 
and Cambodia could generate a huge benefit for both sides," he said.  Somsak 
Rinruengsin, chairman of the Thai business Council of Cambodia, said Thai 
businessmen were still operating in Cambodia as usual.  "Private enterprises 
believe that the conflict should not be brutal.  All transactions are still on track. I 
believe that Thai companies will not withdraw investment as most are in heavy 
industry and have spent huge investment capital," said Somsak.  Many large Thai 
companies have invested in Cambodia, including PTT, ThaiBev, Mitr Pol, CP, 
SCG and Imperial Group.  ―Somsak said about 100 Thai SMEs such as restaurants 
and retailers were still operating normally in Cambodia.‖  According to Somsak, 
most Cambodians still have a positive attitude towards Thailand and Thai 
products.
124
  In October 2008, amidst a 30% drop in business along the border, the 
head of Srisaket Province‘s Chamber of Commerce urged an end to the border 
crisis in order to ―restore the regional economy.‖125 
 
 
The Perspectives Overall: 
 
To sum up, when it comes to perceptions of Thai-Cambodian border problems, 
interviewees tended to either have generalist feelings toward Cambodia or when it 
comes to cases, dwelled on either the sea border or frontier temples.  Moreover, 
there seem to be two distinct Thai perceptions regarding Thai-Cambodian both sea 
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and land border issues.
126
  First, as seen in discussions with respondents 
representing the military, Privy Council, PAD, or conservative academics, 
promotes a traditionalist, hardline security stand towards the frontier.  The other, 
comprised of the ruling coalition (be it led by the PPP/PT or the Democrats), 
civilian bureaucrats, businesspeople, and progressive academics, endorses 
international cooperation, greater diplomacy, and mutual understanding to resolve 
the boundary conflict.  The view of Thailand‘s leading parties (when they are in the 
parliamentary opposition) is somewhere between these two extremes.  When the 
Democrats were the parliamentary opposition, they were aligned with Thai 
nationalists.  But once they led a coalition, their perceptions shifted towards 
bilateral cooperation.  As for the PPP/PT, it too sought greater cooperation with 
Cambodia when it led a ruling coalition.  In the parliamentary opposition, freed 
from the responsibilities of guaranteeing foreign relations, it has criticized the 
Abhisit government, shifting over to a stance similar to that of Thai nationalists.  In 
essence, regarding the perspectives of the two political parties, each has seemed to 
depend on political calculation, driven by what happens to be most popular (and 
perhaps anti-PPP) at the moment.    
What are some plausible arguments for the perceptions of each actor group? 
Perhaps one could say that the general stance of each depends on the societal or 
functional role each one fills.  In other words, where each stands depends on where 
they sit (Miles‘ Law).127  The Privy Council and military are responsible for 
national and monarchical security.  As such, their standpoint tends to be hard-line.  
On the other hand, political parties in a ruling coalition (as well as the private 
sector in civil society) have tended to promote economic collaboration.  Many (but 
not all) foreign Ministry officials also support cooperation through diplomacy 
given that such tasks are part and parcel of Foreign Ministry responsibilities. 
Parties in the parliamentary opposition tend to support whichever side gives them 
the greatest leverage vis-à-vis the ruling coalition.  Opposition parties, however, 
emerge as fluid players in terms of Miles‘ Law.  That is, once they ascend to office, 
these parties may well adopt new perspectives given their changed status.  Such a 
transformation can be seen in the changing position of the Democrat Party from 
2008 to 2009. Meanwhile, the disparity in views among academics owes to the fact 
that different academic groups gravitate more closely to different ideological 
stances.  
The Preah Vihear crisis has ultimately rekindled a latent Thai nationalism 
which reflects anger, distrust, and disdain for Cambodia.  While this perspective 
exists among many in the Thai military as well as reactionary elements of Thai 
society, there is an increasingly business-oriented perspective (exhibited by the 
Samak/Somchai ruling coalition) which has sought to place trade above old 
enmities.  In the age of globalization, this movement toward trade appears to be 
ascending toward a majority perspective which could well push Thailand towards 
moderation in its relations with Cambodia. 
 
 
V. Discussion and Recommendations for Thai Perceptions 
 
In the final analysis, it appears today that nationalism is alive and well today when 
it comes to Thai perceptions of its territorial disputes with Cambodia.  As Kraisak 
Choonhavan states, ―nationalism has been the easiest issue to unite the country 
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 At the time of writing, the pro-Thaksin United front for Democracy Against Dictatorship 
(UDD) ―red shirts‖ had not formally voiced an opinion regarding Thai-Cambodian border 
issues. 
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 Miles, Rufus E., Jr. "The Origin and Meaning of Miles' Law," Public Administration 
Review, 38 (5), 1978, pp. 399-403. 
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especially since 1932.  Such nationalism led to the expansion of Thai borders by 
force.  Soldiers were supposed to sacrifice themselves in the name of nationalism.‖  
The latent intensity of nationalism has thus facilitated the eruption of frontier 
frictions.
128
   
With regard to the Thai-Cambodian border, such tensions revolve around 
three issues in descending order of importance: 1) Preah Vihear and other temples 
which straddle the land frontier; 2) the Thai-Cambodian sea border; and 3) 
boundary disputes near the Emerald Triangle.  Tensions at the Emerald Triangle 
are unlikely to grow given the high-level friction over the temples.  Previous 
border problems at Aranyaprathet-Poipet seem to have faded away with end of the 
civil war in Cambodia, the closing of refugee camps in Aranyaprathet, and the 
growth of cross-border trade in the area.  Though one might think that boundary 
strains would have long ago subsided (given the importance of growing 
commercial intercourse), such tensions grew again, perhaps reflecting domestic 
instability in both countries.  For Thailand, people who disagreed with the PPP 
government (PAD, Democrats, elements of the Privy Council and military) 
negatively emphasized Noppadon Pattama‘s agreements with Cambodia‘s Hun Sen 
government, as the latter sought UNESCO‘s inscription of Preah Vihear.  This 
negative perception of Noppadon (perhaps as a tool of Thaksin Shinawatra) further 
extended to Cambodia, exacerbating anti-Cambodian nationalism.    
But how do Thai standpoints, as reflected in interviews, compare to Thai 
perspectives, as reflected in the literature?  The answer to this question depends on 
which respondent group one addresses.  For example, those respondents 
representing the military, Privy Council, and right-wing extra-parliamentary forces 
(the PAD, and conservative academics) exhibited the most traditionalist and realist 
points-of-views of all respondents.  As such, their standpoints reflected the more 
reactionary views in the literature.  Meanwhile, respondents representing governing 
political parties (be they pro-Thaksin or anti-Thaksin) and businesspeople tended 
to present a view which encouraged cooperation with Cambodia—reflecting later 
trends towards accommodationist free trade.  On the other hand, the parliamentary 
opposition‘s view (regardless of party) tended to reflect the temper of the times.  
This view was initially more hardline, later on more cooperative towards 
Cambodia.  Such standpoints—hardline or cooperative—could be found in the 
literature.  Finally, many progressive extra-parliamentary forces (e.g. forward-
thinking academics) sought greater use of diplomacy and promotion of peace 
between Thais and Cambodians, perhaps agreeing with the postmodernist literature 
of Thongchai (1994).  Taken together, the literature and interviews offer three 
findings.   
First, the four actor groups have distinct interests which shape their 
perspectives (see table 1 below). 
 
Table 1: Relevant Actors, their Interests, and the Character of their 
Perspective 
 
Relevant Actor Interest Character of 
Perspective 
Traditional Powers  
(Privy Council and 
Military) 
Preservation of National 
Security 
Confrontation 
 Pro-Thaksin polical 
parties (People‘ Power 
Party/Puea Thai Party) 
LEADING A RULING 
COALITION 
Preservation of Warm 
LEADING A RULING 
COALITION 
Cooperation 
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Personal interview with former Senator Kraisak Chunhaven, August 4, 2008.
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Relations to Promote 
Trade and Joint Projects 
IN PARLIAMENTARY 
OPPOSITION 
Political Advantage in 
opposition to the Ruling 
Coalition 
IN PARLIAMENTARY 
OPPOSITION 
Depends on the Moment 
 
Anti-Thaksin political 
parties 
(Democrat Party) 
LEADING A RULING 
COALITION 
Preservation of Warm 
Relations to Promote 
Trade and Joint Projects 
IN PARLIAMENTARY 
OPPOSITION 
Political Advantage in 
opposition to the Ruling 
Coalition 
LEADING A RULING 
COALITION 
Cooperation 
IN PARLIAMENTARY 
OPPOSITION 
Depends on the Moment 
Extra-Parliamentary 
Forces 
(demonstrators[PAD], 
academics, journalists, 
businesspeople) 
PAD & conservative 
academics/journalists= 
national security 
Confrontation 
Businesspeople & 
progressive academics = 
Warm ties to promote 
trade or better 
understanding 
Cooperation 
Source: Authors‘ own compilation. 
 
 
Second, perspectives are not static.  For example, the perception of the 
parliamentary opposition, initially hard-line during July 2008, became more 
pragmatic by October.  Finally, some groups‘ views are not monolithic.  Elements 
within extra-bureaucratic forces (academia) and the military have been shown to 
disagree in their perceptions toward Thai-Cambodian border issues. 
The 2008 Thai-Cambodian border crisis has clearly aggravated Thai 
nationalistic perceptions when it comes to territorial disputes with Cambodia.  This 
has been proved most clearly in the current Preah Vihear (KPV) imbroglio.  
Indeed it seems that KPV has created a snowball effect when it comes to other 
potential sticky issues along the frontier—other border temples, the sea boundary, 
and perhaps a final delineation of the Emerald Triangle.  Perhaps a combination of 
time and mostly well-established boundaries between Siam and French Cambodia 
will endure long enough to allow for the two nations two amicably live side by 
side.   
Still, Thailand‘s perspective towards the border depends on which group one 
is addressing—there are a myriad of views.  Thailand‘s current polarized domestic 
political arena has drawn in the subject of Thai-Cambodian boundary relations.  
Some extra-bureaucratic forces (the People‘s Alliance for Democracy or PAD) 
have placed a negative twist on the PPP-led government losing Thai border 
territory to Cambodia.  However, pragmatic civilian business/politician elites are 
increasingly trumping the influence of nationalist Thai actors, be they military or 
the PAD.  Thus the Democrat party, initially critical of FM Noppadon‘s agreement 
with the Cambodian government (perhaps to target the Ruling Coalition), has 
become much more pragmatic.  This trend bodes well for a quieting down of once 
tense boundary disputes.  Greater economic and political cooperation along the 
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border should meanwhile contribute towards more cordial Thai perceptions of 
Cambodia‘s role along the Thai-Cambodian frontier.  
But history is witnessing a sea change in the numerical and substantive Thai 
perspectives on this border.  This has paralleled a changing relevance of different 
actors in Thai society and hence the shifting relevancies of these actors‘ viewpoints 
which matters most in determining the dominant Thai perspective today.  As such, 
given the growing relevance of business associations in Thai politics, one sees in 
Thailand greater attention to trade and economic cooperation with Cambodia 
which has begun to challenge the traditional national security construct.  All in all, 
Thai perspectives, guided increasingly by the exigencies of commerce, may 
contribute to an amelioration of Thai-Cambodian border tensions. 
Recommendations to resolve Thai-Cambodian boundary problems depend on 
both countries achieving the resolve to tackle necessary changes in policy.  Such 
resolve depends on recognition that feelings of territorial nationalism are an 
essential part of the problem.  It would help to understand ―Cambodia‖ and 
―Thailand‖ as collective meanings.  Such meanings can institutionalize our 
cognitive identities as well as shape and reshape them in both antagonistic and 
cooperative ways.  It is also important to realize that identity construction is a fluid 
process which constantly ebbs and flows, and maintains dependence upon social 
interaction over time.  Certain processes such as social learning and mimicry can 
potentially transform the nature of state relations.
129
  This can occur at either the 
level of the locality, state, international organization, or through non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  Thus it is possible to cognitively reshape zero-sum 
nationalistic animosities into positive-sum convivial cooperation.  Such a 
rehabilitation of cognitive ―takes‖ on the ―border‖ from acrimony to concord is 
necessary to mitigate ill feelings based on the territorial self versus the other.  To 
socially reconstruct notions of nationalism, pro-active functionalism might work to 
reduce tensions.  A functionalist or neo-functionalist approach promotes deeper 
mutual integration in the sectors of task performance, including goods, capital, and 
labor.  Successful collaboration in one technical area (by states or other political 
units) encourages the growth of collaboration into other areas.  The growing knots 
of positive technical or economic integration would eventually keep states from 
disengaging from each other.
130
  In the case of Thai-Cambodian border problems, 
joint integrative institutions need to be set up at the level of the locale, NGO, state 
or international organization.  Bilateral mediations can occur at all levels. 
Still, for Thailand, it may be wise to wait for current domestic instability to 
subside before substantive diplomatic efforts to reduce border tensions can be 
effectively completed.  Yet despite the country‘s internal chaos, negotiations need 
to continue over each of the disputed areas.  Meanwhile, at the state-to-state level it 
is essential for both countries to collaborate seriously under the Joint Boundary 
Commission in order to demarcate a clearly-defined border.  An accord delineating 
the Thai-Cambodian boundary would set the way for the greater spillover of 
bilateral cooperation across several areas.  With regard to resolving border 
problems relating to frontier temples, the sea and the Emerald Triangle, the answer 
lies in building integrative joint administration of disputed areas.  Joint 
administration would demonstrate a high degree of diplomatic maturity to both the 
international community and neighbors in the region.  It would also prove to each 
side that although Thai-Cambodian history has been strewn with bombshells, there 
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 See Wendt Alexander. 1992. ―Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics,‖ International Organization, 46, 2, pp. 391-425. 
130
 For a discussion of functionalism, see Mitrany, David. 1948. ―The Functional Approach 
to World Organization,‖ International Affairs, 24, 3, July, pp. 350-63.  For a discussion of 
neo-functionalism, see Haas, Ernst, ―Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional 
Integration,‖ International Organization 30, 2, spring 1976, p. 179. 
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is still room for neighborliness.  Joint administration would moreover encourage 
greater commerce and joint investment between the two countries, especially along 
those border regions where disputes exist (e.g. the proposed golf course straddling 
the Emerald Triangle).  It would furthermore facilitate the creation of a joint de-
mining regime for use in boundary regions, using international experts approved by 
both countries.  Joint administration would also allow for joint operations by Thai 
and Cambodian border police in order to reduce border crime.  It would meanwhile 
allow for restorations of disputed frontier temples on the Thai-Cambodian land 
border (including Ta Moan Thom and Ta Kwai).  With regard to Preah Vihear, 
since the World Court has already granted control control over the temple-
complex, the adjacent 4.6 square kilometer disputed region should be jointly 
administered by both Thailand and Cambodia (following the withdrawal of Thai 
troops).  As for the overlapping ocean boundary, joint administration should be 
implemented as well.  Such a strategy would facilitate greater environmental 
conservation, potential joint tourism projects, and management of natural resources 
in the area.  Indeed, with regard to the exploration and exploitation of oil or gas in 
the disputed maritime area, mitigation of tensions could arise through utilizing 
joint extraction and profit-sharing.  Such a solution would be similar to the Thai-
Malaysian Joint Development Area established in 1979.  In all of these 
aforementioned joint regimes, the purpose is for successful collaboration in one 
area to motivate realization by authorities to promote collaboration into other areas.     
Beyond the state-to-state level, other methods of cooperation can be 
encouraged.  Indeed, at the local administrative or NGO levels, there could be 
greater joint efforts towards environmental conservation, health, or education of 
local people.  This could spillover into joint local conservation of and ceremonies 
honoring frontier temples.  District and provincial chambers of commerce on each 
side of the border could meanwhile hold regular meetings to promote local 
commerce.  Successful collaboration on these fronts could spillover to greater 
cooperation between the Thai and Cambodian national chambers of commerce.  
Successful commercialization would go far in making relevant actors see that 
continued border hostilities are counterproductive.  At a regional level, one way to 
move towards convivial cooperation is for Thailand and Cambodia to join with Lao 
PDR in perhaps deeper integration towards an Emerald Triangle Economic Zone.  
The lucrative benefits of a win-win solution such as this would far outweigh the 
disadvantages of continuing to struggle over which side—Thailand or Cambodia—
deserves certain territories.  At the global level, Thailand and Cambodia could 
mutually nest themselves within larger international regimes (e.g. joint rather than 
unilateral UNESCO inscription of all temples approaching the Thai-Cambodian 
border; greater collaboration in eradicating malaria in frontier areas under the aegis 
of the World Health Organization).   
Through a mutual re-shaping of cognitive processes, traditional collective 
identities fostering coercion can, over time, become convivial cooperation.  
Nationalism in Thailand‘s military and other sectors would gradually lose its 
appeal.  Collaboration in boundary management, perhaps leading to joint profits in 
trade, should thus contribute to greater pacification of Thai-Cambodian relations as 
well as stability and co-prosperity for the border peoples in both countries. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study began with three questions.  First, how have Thai elite actor perceptions 
evolved toward their present state?  Second, what appears to be hindering a more 
moderate Thai stance toward parts of its border conflict with Cambodia?  Third, 
what implications are there from Thai-Cambodian border conflicts, if any, and 
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what patterns can we generalize out of Thai border perceptions which might have 
implications for South and Southeast Asia?  In answer to the first question, where 
once nationalist and reactionary military-royalists dominated elite perceptions of 
Thailand‘s border with Cambodia, it appears now that moderate Thai elite actors 
have attempted to move their country toward a more pragmatic and concordant 
foreign policy based on the exigencies of increased trade, investment, and joint-
tourism ventures with Cambodia—though at a snail‘s pace.  As for the second 
question, it has been the inertia of nationalism amidst continuing extreme political 
polarization in Thailand which has continued to prevent moderates from trumping 
reactionaries on border issues such as Preah Vihear temple.  Such polarization 
reflects the fact that ―it is the socio-political environment that shapes the perception 
of the elite and their understanding of their countries‘ priorities and compulsions 
(Pattanaik, 2004:8).‖  As such, Thai border policy toward Cambodia has remained 
muddled and confused.   
With regard to the third question, there are various implications which one can 
identify and generalize in a comparative perspective, not only addressed to South 
and Southeast Asia but also beyond. First, if the idea of the geo-cultural unity of 
Southeast Asia (more concretely mainland Southeast Asia, based upon linguistic 
and religious similarities) is accepted in principle, it would be much easier to 
formulate effective and combined strategies to deal with contemporary conflicts 
(independent of colonial or non-colonial determinants) as well as with clashes of 
the future. Second, one could contend that the Thai-Cambodian problem is not 
necessarily a lack of clear boundary demarcation, but diametrically opposed 
notions of ―us‖ versus ―them.‖  Thus, any boundary altercation between these two 
countries derives from a history of image enmity.  As a result, pervasive 
nationalism necessarily remains a hindrance to less aggravated levels of 
neighborliness.  This phenomenon of historical hatreds preceding boundary 
disputes can also be found in South Asia (as mentioned above in India-Pakistan 
relations). Third, the Thai-Cambodian border dispute—and accompanying 
acrimonious perceptions—illustrates the fact that geo-cultural unity has yet to be 
achieved in Southeast Asia (at least between Thailand and Cambodia) despite the 
aspirations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) for some form of 
harmonious ASEAN ―way.‖131  Similarly, the SAARC (South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation) suffers from bilateral disputes, mutual mistrust and 
hostility among its members despite its objective to enhance a spirit of friendship, 
trust and understanding.
132
 
To sum up, one can state that the formulation of border policy in South and 
Southeast Asia ―has been highly elitist‖.  ―The reason for the monopoly of elite 
veto-players on the‖ countries‘ approaches towards the solution to boundary 
disputes is due to the fact that such decisions shape the contemporary and future 
image of the state on the international level.  Therefore, guided to a large extent by 
emotions and sentiments these elite players have cultivated in both regions an 
uncompromising, non-negotiable attitude.  This has led to serious consequences on 
the national integrity and sovereignty of the young states.  In the South Asian 
context, there is a remarkable tendency that traditional identity formation (e.g. 
based on the Two-Nation-Theory) is no longer perceived as the primary principle 
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 Though Thai-Cambodian border frictions are currently the most visible, boundary 
disputes (often exacerbated by the cross-border movement of ethnic groups) continue to 
exist between Thailand and its other neighbors: Burma/Myanmar (overlapping maritime 
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for any country‘s foreign policy formulations, especially in the case of Pakistan.  
This is due to an evolving belief that the incorporation of economic interests into 
the nation‘s decision-making process would strengthen bilateral relations to 
salvage the intra-state as well as inter-state political crisis over the border issues.  
This understanding leads not only to a sustainable restructuring and rethinking of 
long-established threat perceptions and subsequently-derived political stands, but 
also to remove border issues from the center stage in bilateral relations.  To 
implement this need for an engagement in social, economic and political 
cooperation, one can generalize the following:  1) There must be a fundamental 
shift in elite perceptions regarding priorities in border policy, especially in terms of 
the construction of identity using mainly exclusive, cultural and primordial codes 
(―we‖ versus ―the other‖) towards the formulations of socio-economic and political 
goals of the nation as the new benchmark of public policies.  2) A consensus 
among elites must emerge that it is essential to create a much-enhanced level of 
harmony in bilateral relations before specific border issues can even be addressed.  
In other words, national identity constructions and elite behavior of one state can 
no longer remain a fundamental threat to the identity of other states, denying the 
validity of the other‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  3) A step-by-step-
approach must commence in which the less-contentious border issues are 
addressed first to create a positive environment (using both formal and informal 
[e.g. Track II diplomacy] exchange) to later enable resolution of the most 
contentious issues.  In the final analysis, where blurred boundaries meet image 
enmity at a nation‘s edge, conflicts can ensue which tend to economically, socially, 
and politically devastate not only the countries involved but also the extended 
region which surrounds them.  Where moderate, forward-thinking elite actors 
eventually come to direct border policies, promoting commerce, diplomacy and 
social exchanges, this will create corridors of potential or greater cooperation. 
 
 
Appendices: 
 
Appendix 1: Boundary Conflicts in the Extended South Asia Region 
 
Disputants Name of Disputed Area Level of Border 
Hostility in 
Disputed Area, 2009 
(High, Medium, 
Low) 
Pakistan, Afghanistan Durand-Line (including Balochistan, 
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas)/North West Frontier Province) 
High 
India, Pakistan Line of Control / Kashmir High/Medium 
India, Pakistan Siachen (including Saltoro 
Ridge)/Kashmir  
High/Medium 
India, Pakistan Sir Creek Medium 
India, Pakistan Rann of Kutch Medium 
India, Pakistan, China Shaksgam Valley/Kashmir Low 
India, China Aksai Chin/ Xinjiang (including 
Demchok)/Kashmir 
Low 
India, China Arunachal Pradesh (Assam 
region/Tawang) 
Medium/Low 
India, Nepal Kalapani region (Darchula district) Medium/Low 
India, Nepal Susta Region (Nawalparasi) Low 
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Note: Authors own compilation. 
 
India, Sri Lanka Kachatheevu Island Medium 
India, Bangladesh Bay of Bengal - Maritime border 
(including 12 Mile-Zone; 200 + 300 
Mile-Exclusive Economic Zone) 
Medium 
India, Bangladesh Bay of Bengal - Maritime Boundary: 
South Talpatti/New Moore/Purbasha 
Island 
Medium 
India, Bangladesh Lathitilla-Dumabari (Assam sector)  Low 
India, Bangladesh Muhuri river/Beloni (Tripura sector)  Low 
India, Bangladesh Enclaves/Chits (including Pyrdiwah 
and Berubari) 
Medium 
Bangladesh, 
Myanmar/Burma 
Naf River islands (Arakan State-Teknaf 
Cox's Bazar District) 
High 
Bangladesh, 
Myanmar/Burma 
Maritime Boundary (12 + 200 Mile-
Zones) 
Medium 
Bhutan, China Kula Kangri (northwest Bhutan) Low 
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Appendix 2: Map of Thailand/Cambodia with the four disputed border areas 
highlighted
 
 
Source: Based upon www.photoseek.com/Thailand; authors own modifications. 
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Appendix 3: Thai Airways Routes Map—1994 
Preah Vihear or Khao Phra Viharn can clearly be seen on the Thai side of the Thai-
Cambodian border. 
Though not an official Thai map, this chart does demonstrates a view prevalent in 
Thai society. 
 
 
Source: St. John, Ronald Bruce. ―Preah Vihear and the Cambodia-Thailand Borderland,‖ 
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin January 1994, p. 67.
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